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INTRODUCTION: THE KEY STATUTORY PROVISIONS

When the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground and ripped itself
open in Alaska's coastal waters in March 1989, spilling an estimated eleven
million gallons of crude oil,1 Congress had been trying for more than a
decade to enact comprehensive marine oil spill legislation.2 The previously
unimagined scale and scope of the Valdez tragedy jolted Congress into a
more productive mode,3 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA") was
enacted and signed into law on August 18, 1990.4
1. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476-78 (2008).
2. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, LIABILITY FOR ECONomic Loss IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEEPWATER HORIZON SPILL 7 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/Goldberg.Memorandum.
of.Law.2010.pdf, reprinted in 30 Miss. C. L. REV. 335 app. (2011).
3. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 6. The Exxon Valdez spill was "only the world's fifty-seventh largest." Raffi Khatchadourian, The Gulf War, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 14, 2011, at 39 available
at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/03/14/110314fa fact-khatchadourian?printable. But in
this country the Valdez spill had a unique political impact because it was so "ecologically devastating"
and it was the United States' first huge one. Id. Famous larger spills include the thirty-seven million
gallons of Kuwaiti crude oil released when the Torrey Canyon went aground off Cornwall in 1967 and
the estimated 120-million-gallon spill caused by the semi-submersible drilling rig Sedco 135-F in the Bay
of Campeche, Mexico, in June 1979. Id.; see Ixtoc I Oil Spill, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikillxtoc I oil
spill (last visited June 3, 2011); see also Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767
F.2d 1140,1142 (5th Cir. 1985) (referring to the Ixtoc I spill as "the world's largest"). Oil from the Ixtoc
spill reached Texas beaches, but the national political impact of the incident was negligible.
Some analysts have noted that the 1989-90 Congress was jolted not just by the Exxon Valdez spill
but by several other spills occurring not long after Valdez, including "the World Prodigy oil spill off the
coast of Rhode Island in June 1989; the American Trader oil spill along the coast of California in
February 1990; and the Mega Borg explosion, fire, and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in June 1990."
Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and FinancialResponsibility Under the Oil PollutionAct of
1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUT. MAR. L.J. 481, 482 (2000).
4. Act of Aug. 18, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484. Title I of the Act, captioned Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation (§§ 1001-1020), is codified at 33 U.S.C. §§#2701-2730 (2011).
Because most practitioners and lower-court judges seem to find the Title 33 counterparts more easily
accessible than the provisions of the Act itself, this Article cites to OPA by using the Title 33 section
numbers.
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In their deliberations on the bills that eventually coalesced to become
OPA, members of Congress expressed deep dissatisfaction with virtually
everything about this country's lack of preparedness for disasters like
Valdez. One major theme in this outpouring of official grief and anger was
the view that the thousands upon thousands of individuals, communities,
and businesses whose lives and livelihoods were destroyed, disrupted, or
damaged should have had (but often were denied) adequate, fair, and
speedy compensation.5 Congress believed that such relief should be guaranteed for the victims of all future spills.
OPA addresses these concerns by imposing strict (no-fault) liability on
the party or parties responsible for an oil spill. 6 This strict liability is lim7
ited (but only slightly) by a narrowly crafted set of affirmative defenses.
An oil polluter held strictly liable under OPA is potentially protected by a
cap on the damages owed,8 but a claimant can break the cap by showing
that the responsible party's gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of a federal safety statute or regulation "proximately caused" the
spill. 9 Victims who are not fully compensated by a responsible party 0may
claim against a federally administered Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
OPA makes polluters (and, when polluters can't or won't pay, the
Fund) responsible for removal costs and for a "wide range" of damages.11
The OPA provisions with which this Article is centrally concerned are
those specifying the types of damages available. The immediately relevant
statutory provisions are set forth just below. The central focus of this Article is the meaning of the language in italics (supplied).
33 U.S.C. § 2702. Elements of liability
(a) In general

Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the provisions of this Act, each responsible party for
a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which
poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or
upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and
5. See infra note 58.
6. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2011).

7. 33 U.S.C. § 2703 (2011).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2011).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (2011). In the Oil Spill Litigation, supra note *, the principal defendant
has waived the damages caps. Statement of BP Exploration & Production Inc. Re Applicability of
Limit of Liability Under Oil Pollution Act of 1990, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2010 WL 4151003, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 18,
2010).
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(11), 2712(a)(4) (2011). The Fund, which is funded primarily by a tax on oil
imports, cannot pay more that $1 billion for any single incident. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (2011). It is
administered by the Coast Guard under regulations published in Part 136 of Title 33 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.
11. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 12 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 734.
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damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that result
from such incident.
(b) Covered removal costs and damages
(1) Removal costs
(2) Damages

The damages referred to in subsection (a) of this section are the
following:
(A) Natural resources

Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use
of, natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing the damage, which shall be recoverable by a United
States trustee, a State trustee, and Indian tribe trustee, or a
foreign trustee.
(B) Real or personal property

Damages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns or leases that property.
(C) Subsistence use

Damages for loss' of subsistence use of natural resources,
which shall be recoverable by any claimant who so uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed, or lost,
without regard to the ownership or management of the
resources.
(D) Revenues

Damages equal to the net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees,
or net profit shares due to the injury, destruction, or loss of
real property, personal property, or natural resources, which
shall be recoverable by the Government of the United
States, or a political subdivision thereof.
(E) Profits and earning capacity

Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real
property, personalproperty, or natural resources, which shall

be recoverable by any claimant.
(F) Public services

Damages for net costs of providing increased or additional
public services during or after removal activities, including
protection from fire, safety, or health hazards, caused by a
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discharge of oil, which shall be recoverable by a State, or a
political subdivision of a State.

II. THE

MACONDO (DEEPWATER HORIZON)

OIL SPILL

Disagreement about the meaning of the above-emphasized language
of Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E) is presently at the heart of the litigation 1 2 stemming from the monstrous Macondo's oil well spill into the Gulf
of Mexico on April 20, 2010, when the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded, burned, and capsized, killing eleven workers, injuring many other
from the
workers, and causing oil and gas to begin spewing into the Gulf
4
wellhead almost a mile (5,000 feet) below the ocean surface.' The flow of
oil into the Gulf was not staunched until July 15, 2010. By then, an estimated 200 million gallons of oil (perhaps twenty times as much as the
Valdez spill) had entered the Gulf.
The Macondo well is located forty-three miles off the coast of Louisiana and about ninety-eight miles from the coasts of Mississippi and Alabama. Hundreds of thousands of individuals and businesses in those states,
as well as in Florida, Texas, and other states, have sustained economic harm
and are seeking recompense. Some of these victims-those who owned or
leased real or personal property affected by the spill-can invoke subsection B of Section 2702(b)(2). For most of them, though, the crucial provision is Section 2702(b)(2)(E).

III. THE PRECISE QUESTION TREATED

IN THIS ARTICLE

The central question addressed by this Article is the correct interpretation of 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (quoted above in Part I). For analyzing
this question, the proper starting place is the combined language of subsections 2702(a) and (b)(2)(E). Paraphrased and combined, these provisions
look like this:
12. See supra note *.
13. "Macondo" was the name that one of the operating companies, presumably BP, gave to the
exploratory well. This was also the name of a fictional town in Gabriel Garcia Marquez's novel ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLrrUDE. In the novel, the village of Macondo, grown into a city, is eventually
wiped off the map by a gigantic windstorm.
14. The information in this section of this Article is taken from the pleadings on file in the Oil
Spill Litigation, supra note *.
15. To recover damages under subsection (B) of Section 2702(b)(2), an owner or lessor must

trace its damages to "injury to" or "destruction of" its own (leased or owned) property. Under subsection (E), that same claimant (like claimants who did not own or lease any involved property) can
recover on showing that the claimant sustained lost profits or impaired earning capacity "due to the
injury, destruction, or loss" of natural resources or of anyone's property. See In re Taira Lynn Marine
Ltd., 444 F.3d 371, 382 (5th Cir. 2006) (indicating that property owners could invoke both subsections
(B) and (E)); In re Settoon Towing L.L.C., 2009 WL 4730969 at *3A- (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2009) (holding
that when a spill temporarily prevented the owner of an undamaged offshore platform from using it, the
owner had a cause of action under subsection (E)); Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F.
Supp. 1008, 1015 (E.D. La. 1993) (same).
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Subsection (a): A party responsible for an oil spill or a substantial threat of an oil spill owes certain categories of damages that "result from" the spill or threat.
Subsection (b)(2)(E): Among those categories of recoverable damages are "loss of profits or impairment of earning
capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources."
For ease of presentation, it will sometimes be useful to refer to the "loss of
profits" and "impairment of earning capacity" covered by subsection
(b)(2)(E) as "pure economic loss."1 6 In simplified form, the question addressed in this Article is: What must a pure economic loss victim show in
order to establish that his damages "result[ed] from" a spill (or threat) and
were "due to the injury, destruction, or loss of [property] or natural
resources?"
IV.

THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, THE GOLDBERG PAPER, AND
THE COMMERCIAL-USE-RIGHT THEORY

The meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) was recently addressed at
some length by Harvard Law School Professor John C. P. Goldberg.1 7 The
circumstances leading to the production of Professor Goldberg's paper are
sketched below.18
The operator of the Macondo site was BP Exploration and Production,
Inc., a subsidiary of BP, PLC. Transocean, Ltd. owned the Deepwater Horizon. The Coast Guard has designated BP and Transocean as "responsible
parties" under OPA. 19 As a "responsible party," BP was required by 33

16. Economic losses caused by physical damage to the plaintiff's real or personal property are
routinely regarded as recoverable and non-problematic. (Such damages are addressed by OPA in 33
U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B).) The term "pure economic loss" refers to economic losses that do not stem
from physical injury to the plaintiff's person or tangible property. DAVID W. ROBERTSON, WILLIAM
POWERS, JR. DAVID A. ANDERSON & OLIN Guy WELLBORN II, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
251 (4th ed. 2011).
17. See

GOLDBERG,

supra note 2.

18. Much of the information in the two paragraphs just below is taken from the pleadings on file

in the Oil Spill Litigation, supra note *.

19. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32) defines "responsible party" as the vessel or facility from which the spill
or threatened spill emanated. Section 2714(a) requires the President (acting through the Coast Guard),
upon learning of a spill or threatened spill, to designate and "immediately notify" the party or parties
deemed responsible. Transocean takes the position that it is responsible only for the oil that leaked
from the rig (by some accounts about 700,000 gallons of fuel) and not for the millions of barrels of oil
that spewed from the underwater well.
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U.S.C. § 2714(b) to set up and advertise a claims procedure. 2 0 In recogni-

tion of that obligation-and by some accounts in response to the blandishments of President Obama2 1 -BP set up the Gulf Coast Claims Facility
(GCCF) and put a famous and well-credentialed attorney/mediator, Kenneth Feinberg, in charge of it.2 2
The purpose of the GCCF is to settle claims for economic and other
losses made against BP. The Facility initially presented itself to the public
as "neutral," 23 but the federal district judge in charge of the Oil Spill Litigation subsequently issued an order directing BP, Feinberg, and the GCCF
to "[r]efrain from referring to the GCCF, Ken Feinberg, or [Feinberg's law
firm] as 'neutral' or completely 'independent' from BP." 24 The court's order further stated: "It should be clearly disclosed in all communications,
whether written or oral, that said parties are acting for and on behalf of BP
in fulfilling its statutory obligations as the 'responsible party' under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990."925
Mr. Feinberg has a $20 billion settlement fund to work with. This fund
is "intended to make whole both private enterprises (for lost earnings) and
the states and the federal government (for cleanup costs)." 26 The GCCF is
also trying to use the fund to settle personal injury and death claims. 2 7
Given the tragic physical and emotional consequences of the Deepwater
Horizon explosion and the apparent magnitude of the Macondo spill's
physical, emotional, and economic effects, $20 billion is probably not
enough money. According to the New York Times, Feinberg-in quest of
legal principles that might justify the exclusion of economic loss claimants
from areas of the country remote from the spill and its physical effectsturned to Professor Goldberg for assistance. Here is the Times account:
20. 33 U.S.C. § 2714(b)(1) provides that unless the designated responsible party denies the designation, the responsible party "shall advertise the designation and the procedures by which claims may
be presented." Section 2714(b)(2) provides that the advertisement "shall state that a claimant may
present a claim for interim, short-term damages representing less than the full amount of damages to
which the claimant ultimately may be entitled and that payment of such a claim shall not preclude
recovery for damages not reflected in the paid or settled partial claim."
21. See, e.g., GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 4.
22. The Goldberg paper seems to go out of its way to emphasize that setting up the fund was
voluntary on BP's part and that the GCCF and Mr. Feinberg are neutral and independent of BP. See
Id. at 4-6. None of that appears to be true. OPA required BP to set up a settlement procedure and to
pay interim claims without insisting on full releases. See supra note 20. And the federal judge in charge
of the Oil Spill Litigation has ordered the GCCF and Feinberg to cease and desist from claiming independence and neutrality. See Oil Spill Litigation, Order and Reasons, infra note 24.
23. See, e.g., Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocolfor Interim and Final Claims, Nov. 22, 2010, at 2,
available at http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/the-corporate-court/crude-justice/gccf-protocolfor-interim-and-final-claims-2010.pdf (stating that "[t]he GCCF is administered by Kenneth R. Feinberg, ('the Claims Administrator'), a neutral fund administrator") (hereinafter "Protocol").
24. See Order and Reasons at 13-14, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the
Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://www.laed.
uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/2220110rderonRecDoc912.pdf.
25. Id. at 14.
26. David Segal, Should BP's Money Go Where Oil Didn't?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 2010, at 1,
available at http://www.nytimes.conil2010/10/24fbusiness/24claim.html.
27. See Protocol, supra note 23, at 1.
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Working outside of the court system, Mr. Feinberg isn't necessarily constrained by [OPA], or state or federal tort law.
But to figure out what, if anything, these claimants should
be paid, he needs a sense of what would become of them if
they slogged through the dockets.
So Mr. Feinberg has quietly hired one of the country's foremost scholars on torts-he declined to provide a name [we
now know it is Professor Goldberg]-to write a memorandum about the validity and value of [economic loss] claims.
The memo is due soon, and Mr. Feinberg has no idea what it
will say. But it won't serve as a blueprint, he says. It will
serve as leverage. If the memo states, for instance, that certain [economic loss] claims are stinkers, Mr. Feinberg could
say to claimants, "You'll get nothing in court, but I'll give
you 20 cents or 30 cents on the dollar." 28
About a month after the Times article appeared, Professor Goldberg
transmitted his report to Mr. Feinberg, who made it publicly available. 2 9
The report does indeed say that some economic loss claims-in fact, a great
many of them-are stinkers. In a succinct, clear Executive Summary at the
beginning of the paper, Goldberg writes (emphasis supplied):
Under OPA, a person may obtain compensation for economic loss from a party responsible for a spill if she can
prove that her loss is "due to" harm to property or resources that "result[s] from" the spill, irrespective of
whether she owns that property or those resources. This
statutory language is best understood to allow recovery only
by those economic loss claimants who can prove that they
have suffered economic loss because a spill has damaged, destroyed, or otherwise rendered physically unavailable to them
property or resources that they have a right to put to commer-

cial use. Thus, if a spill were to deprive commercial fishermen of expected profits by killing fish they ordinarily would
catch and sell, or by causing authorities to bar the fishermen
from accessing those fish for a period of time, the fishermen
would be entitled to recover. By contrast, operators of
beach resorts in areas physically unaffected by a spill, but
that nonetheless suffer economic loss because of a general
downturn in tourism resulting from the spill, are among
those who are not entitled to recovery under OPA.3 0

28. Segal, supra note 26, at 4.
29. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2.
30. Id. at 3.
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It will be useful to call the above-emphasized proposal the commercial-useright requirement.

In the body of his paper, Goldberg demonstrates that the commercialuse-right requirement would be an extraordinarily potent exclusionary
tool. Part VI below borrows elements of that demonstration as a way of
emphasizing the narrow coverage Section 2702(b)(2)(E) would have in
Professor Goldberg's world, and to demonstrate that Congress probably
had broader aims for the provision.
V. A

MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD INTERPRETATION OF
Loss PROVISIONS 3 '

OPA's EcoNoMic

At the end of the day, the intended meaning of 33 U.S.C.

§ 2702(b)(2)(E) is tolerably apparent.3 2 But it may not be apparent at first
31. See infra note 56 (arguing that the subtitle's "mid-road" characterization is justified).
32. This Article's claim that the relevant OPA provisions express a clear meaning entails an underlying assumption that the statute was carefully drafted. This assumption rests on generally comfortable ground-Congress worked intensively on the statute for many months, the legislative history is
copious, and nobody in Congress could have doubted the critical importance of the legislation.
But the assumption of clear draftsmanship is not entirely free from doubt. Two irritating anomalies are apparent in some of the statute's key language. First, Section 2701(5)-defining the term damages as used throughout the statute-states that the term "means damages specified in section 2702(b)
. . . and includes the cost of assessing these damages." Section 2702(b)(2)(A)-providing for the recovery by governmental trustees of damages for injury to natural resources-repeats that these damages
"includ[e] the reasonable costs of assessing the damage." But the ensuing subsections of § 2702(b)(2)subsections (B) through (F)-use the term damages without saying anything about damage-assessment
costs. So, is the subsection (A) language about assessment costs a redundancy? Or does that language
imply that no assessment costs are allowed by the ensuing subsections (B) through (F)? The correct
answer is probably redundancy, but Congress should have tried harder to avoid creating this puzzle.
Second, subsection (A) of Section 2702(b)(2) provides for recovery by governmental trustees of
damages for "injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources" (emphasis supplied),
whereas subsection (D) (providing for recovery by governmental entities of damages for lost revenues
and taxes) and subsection (E) (the core economic loss provision that is the central focus of this Article)
use a formulation-"injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources"-that omits the loss-of-use phrase. Does the inclusion of "loss of use" in subsection (A) and
the omission of "loss of use" in subsections (D) and (E) mean that a loss of use of natural resources is
not compensable under (D) and (E)? It certainly could mean that. See Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying the Russello canon to the disparity between subsections (A) (on the one hand) and (D)
and (E) (on the other) would yield strange results. Subsection 2702(a) imposes liability for the "damages specified in subsection (b) . . . that result from" "the substantial threat of a discharge of oil," yet if
we treat the omission of "loss of use" from (D) and (E) as purposive, those subsections might often,
perhaps generally, deny recovery in threatened discharge cases. Moreover, the Russello canon would
also raise difficulties with the application of subsection (C) of section 2702(b)(2) in threat cases. Subsection (C) allows the recovery of "damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources" but seemingly only when "natural resources . . . have been injured, destroyed, or lost." Here too, reading
subsection (A) to cover a broader range of situations than the ensuing subsections produces a potential
anomaly in threat cases.
Professor Goldberg argues persuasively that the subsection (E) term "loss" should be read to include loss of use. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 19-20 n.40 (arguing that fishermen who cannot fish
because of a threat-caused embargo have suffered a loss of natural resources within the meaning of
subsection (E)). I agree with Goldberg on this point-and I think we need to accept the same argument on behalf of subsistence fishermen who invoke subsection (C)-but we have to realize that here
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blush. An informed reading of the statute requires some understanding of
the jurisprudential background and some grasp of the legislative history.
A.

Deep Background: Admiralty Jurisdiction and Federal Maritime Law

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution brings "all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction" under the authority of the federal courts and
Congress, and it subjects these cases to federal-law governance. 3 In general, the following simplified statement of the matter holds true: Admiralty
cases are governed by federal maritime law.34 The Exxon Valdez litigation
was an admiralty (and thus federal maritime) case, and so is the Macondo
Oil Spill Litigation.
Federal maritime law includes two tortfeasor-friendly doctrines that
can provide great comfort to a marine oil-pollution defendant. The first is
the right of a shipowner to limit its liability to the value of the vessel (measured after the accident) if the shipowner can show that the damages
sought by the accident victims came about "without the privity or knowledge of the [ship]owner." 3 The second-variously referred to as the Robins Dry Dock rule or the Testbank rule3 -often prevents economic-loss
victims from recovering damages unless they can show that they owned or
leased property that was physically damaged in the accident that caused
their economic losses.3
For cases falling within its scope, OPA nullifies both the shipowners'
limited-liability doctrine and the Robins/Testbank doctrine. 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a) states that the strict liability it imposes on oil polluters is
again (as with the damages-assessment puzzle) reaching the desired resolution requires treating a portion of Section 2702(b)(2)(A) as redundant.
33. See generally DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM (Found. Press 1970).
34. Federal maritime law emanates from the federal courts and from Congress. See Panama R.
Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 387 (1924) (explaining that the constitutional grant of "admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" to the federal judicial power enables both the federal courts and Congress to
provide admiralty and maritime governance and stating that "there is no room for doubt that the power
of Congress extends to the entire subject and permits of the exercise of a wide discretion.") Courtmade federal maritime law is often called "general maritime law"; it is "federal common law." Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 483 (2008). In modern times, congressional authority over the
admiralty and maritime field has become preeminent. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36
(1990) (stating that "[miaritime tort law is now dominated by federal statute").
35. 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b) (2011).
36. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (citing Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1927), for the proposition that "physical
damage to a proprietary interest [is] a prerequisite to recovery for economic loss in cases of unintentional maritime tort").
37. Testbank could be read to establish a more defendant-friendly rule that would require an
economic-loss plaintiff to show that the damages sought were caused by (rather than merely being
accompanied by) physical damage to the plaintiff's person or property. Subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions indicate that the less demanding (accompanied by) requirement stated in the text is the correct
reading. See In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd., 444 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that Testbank
barred claims "for economic losses unaccompanied by damage to a proprietary interest"); Lloycs Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447, 1450-51 (5th Cir. 1989) (separate opinion by Judge Higginbotham,
the author of the en banc opinion in Testbank, eschewing the causal-connection-requirement interpretation of Testbank). Judge Higginbotham's opinion in Lloyd's Leasing is analyzed in David W. Robertson, An American Perspective on Negligence Law, in MARKESINIS AND DEAKIN'S TORT LAw 283,
300-02 (6th ed. 2008).
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"[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law," and the August 1,
1990, Conference Report explaining the bill that was enacted into law and
signed by President George H. W. Bush on August 18 states (emphasis
supplied):
Liability under this Act is established notwithstanding any
other provision or rule of law. This means that the liability
provisions of this Act would govern compensation for removal costs and damages notwithstanding any limitations
under existing statutes such as the act of March 3, 1851 (46
U.S.C. 183)," or under existing requirements that physical
damage to the proprietaryinterest of the claimant be shown.3 9

Moreover, Section 2702(b)(2)(E) provides that economic loss damages
"shall be recoverable by any claimant," and the Conference Report explains (emphasis supplied):
Subsection (b)(2)(E) provides that any claimant may recover for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
resulting from injury to property or natural resources. The
claimant need not be the owner of the damaged property or
resources to recover for lost profits or income.40

This much really seems undebatable: Congress wanted to make sure that
marine oil polluters could not use these two major maritime-law defensive
doctrines as a shield against OPA liability.41
38. This is the Shipowners' Limited Liability Act, presently codified at 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2011).
39. H.R. REP. No. 101-653, at 103 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781 (Conf. Rep.).
40. Id.
41. This footnote belabors the obvious-that the Robins/Testbank rule is expunged from OPA
cases. It does so because the major thrust of Professor Goldberg's proposed interpretation of 33 U.S.C.
§§ 2702(a) and (b)(2)(E)-his commercial-use-right requirement, treated supra at note 30 and infra in
Parts VI-C and VII-is to preserve as much of the Robins/Testbank jurisprudence as possible.
Cases holding or stating that OPA nullifies the Robins/Testbank rule include In re Taira Lynn
Marine Ltd., 444 F.3d 371, 382 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1252-53 (9th Cir.
2001); Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994); Dunham-Price Group,
L.L.C. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 2010 WL 1285446 at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010); In re Settoon
Towing L.L.C., 2009 WL 4730969 at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2009); In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F.
Supp. 697, 702 (D. N.J. 1995); Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1014-15
(E.D. La. 1993); Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 768-69 (Alaska 1999). In FGDI,
L.L.C v. M/V Lorelay, an OPA defendant conceded that it owed damages to a claimant who could not
have qualified for recovery under the Robins/Testbank regime. 193 Fed. App'x 853, 2006 WL 2351835
at *1 (11th Cir. 2006).
The commentators agree that OPA ousts the Robins/Testbank rule. See Steven R. Swanson, OPA
90 + 10: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 After Ten Years, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 135, 150-52 (2001);
Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and FinancialResponsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481, 531-32 (2000); Keith B. LeTourneau &
Wesley T. Welmaker, The Oil Pollution Act uf 1990: FederalJudicial Interpretation Through the End of
the Millennium, 12 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 147, 200-02 (2000); Francis J. Gonynor, Six Years Before the Mast:
The Evolution of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 9 13S.F. MAR. L.J. 105, 126-27 (1996); Cynthia M.
Wilkinson, L. Pittman, & Rebecca F. Dye, Slick Work: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 12
J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCEs & ENVTL. L. 181, 264 (1992); Gregg L. McMurdy, Comment, An Overview of OPA 1990 and Its Relationship to Other Laws, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 423, 427-30 (1993); Cameron
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The Facially Apparent Meaning of Section 2702(b) (2) (E): A Factual
Causation Interpretation

As we saw in Part III above, 33 U.S.C. §H 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E)
have to be read together. Taken together, they say that an economic loss
victim who invokes subsection (b)(2)(E) must show that his damages "result[ed] from" the spill and were "due to" the injury, destruction, or loss of
tangible 42 property or natural resources.
The statutory terms "result from" (subsection 2702(a)) and "due to"
(subsection 2702(b)(2)(E)) are not specialized legal terms; they are English-language synonyms for the term "caused by." 43 As we will see in Part
VII below, Professor Goldberg's entire proposal rests on an asserted major
difference between the meanings of the OPA terms "result from" and "due
to." But the asserted difference is imaginary; it is Goldberg's own creation,
a deliberate and purposive illusion. The thrust and direction of Professor
Goldberg's creativity are fully treated in Part VII. For the present, it
should suffice to note that the House Conference Report summarizes Section 2702(b)(2)(E)-Goldberg's pivotal "due to" provision-as follows
(emphasis supplied): "Subsection (b)(2)(E) provides that any claimant may
recover for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from
[the statutory term is "due to"] injury to property or natural resources." 4 4
The significance of the House Conference Report's phrasing of subsection
(E) is huge: The Report expresses subsection (E)'s "due to" requirement
by using the term "resulting from." Here we have an authoritative indication by Congress that the Section 2702(b)(2)(E) term "due to" has the
same meaning as the Section 2702(a) term "result from." This by itself
substantially refutes the Goldberg proposal.
Plainly enough, in the statute as in the English language, "result from"
and "due to" are synonyms for "caused by." 45 In the English language, the
H. Totten, Note, Recovery for Economic Loss Under Robins Dry Dock and the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 18 TUL. MAR. L.J. 167, 171-73 (1993); Daniel Kopec & H. Philip Peterson, Note, Crude Legislation: Liability and Compensation Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 623-24
(1992).
42. Sekco suggests that "[fluture earnings derived from drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf
[might] constitute property" within the meaning of subsection E. 820 F. Supp. at 1015. However, it is
hard to imagine administering the statute without the tangibility criterion.
43. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 403 (1981) (defining
"due to" as "caused by"), 510 (in a list of synonyms for "follow," stating that "result refers to an event
that is discernibly caused by a prior event or events"), 1109 (defining the verb "result" as "to occur or
exist as a consequence of a particular cause," and referring to the list of synonyms for "follow"), 1109
(defining "resultant" as "issuing or following as a consequence or result"). See also Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (determining the meaning of the statutory term "because of"
by referring to an ordinary dictionary and to considerations of "ordinary meaning" and "common
talk").
44. H.R. REP. No. 101-653, at 103.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 uses the causation-related terms "result from" (subsection a), "resulting
from" (subsection b(2)(B)), "due to" (subsections b(2)(D) and b(2)(E)), and "caused by" (subsection
b(2)(F)). I can find nothing in the statute's text, jurisprudential background, or legislative history that
even hints that different meanings were intended. Arguably Congress would have done better to strive
for uniform use of the everyday term "caused by" in lieu of the synonyms. Cf supra note 32 (questioning other aspects of the draftsmanship that went into OPA).
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term "caused by" normally refers to factual causation, 4 6 not to what Professor Goldberg calls "proximate cause." 47 It seems plain that the combination of Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E) requires an economic-loss
claimant to establish that the defendant's spill was a factual cause of injury,
destruction, or loss of tangible property or natural resources that in turn
was a factual cause of the claimant's damages-nothing more and nothing
less. Because the prevailing, default test for factual causation in AngloAmerican tort law is the but-for test,4 8 we can be fairly precise about the
evident meaning of Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E) for an economicloss claimant: The claimant is required to show that if the spill had not
brought about the injury, destruction, or loss of tangible property or natural resources, the damages complained of probably would not have been

sustained. 49
VI.

CONTRASTING THE FACTUAL CAUSATION INTERPRETATION WITH
THE GOLDBERG USE-RIGHT INTERPRETATION: GOLDBERG'S
"UNIVERSE OF POTENTIAL PURE ECONOMIC

Loss

CLAIMANTS"

For illustrating the possible ranges of meaning of the "due to" language in Section 2702(b)(2)(E), Professor Goldberg has provided an admirable tool. Positing a large Gulf of Mexico oil spill-something on the
order of the BP-Macondo spill, a spill with widespread effects including a
great deal of physical damage to natural resources and propertyGoldberg presents a realistically imagined sixteen-item sketch of a "Universe of Potential Pure Economic Loss Claimants."5 0 With two modifications, this sketch is reproduced below." Note that the sketch moves from
cases that seem intuitively to entail direct and immediate causation in the
direction of (intuitively) increasingly remote causation. Note also that we
are assuming that all these claimants can prove what they allege. As Professor Goldberg astutely observes, "[T]here is no particular reason to think
that claimants more closely connected to the spill in time and space will, as
a class, be in a better position to offer [sufficient evidence to support their
allegations respecting damages and factual causation], or that claimants
46. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 214 (1981) (defining
the noun "cause" to mean "that which produces an effect, result, or consequence" and the verb "cause"
to mean "make happen").
47. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 20 & n.41.
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
cmt. b (2010). See also Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (stating that "in common talk, the phrase
and
§ 26
'based on' indicates a but-for causal relationship and thus a necessary logical condition, and . . . the
statutory phrase 'based on' has the same meaning as the phrase 'because of') (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
49. Some imprecision is brought into the factual causation inquiry by the uncertain meaning of
the statutory term "loss," which OPA does not define. As we saw supra note 32, Professor Goldberg
makes a plausible argument that Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s term "loss" can sometimes mean loss of use.
See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 19-20 n.40.
50. Id. at 12-14.
51. The modifications are adding the numbers and inserting hypothetical claimant #2.
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[further] removed from the spill will be less well-positioned to offer such
evidence."52
Professor Goldberg's "Universe of Potential Pure Economic Loss
Claimants," augmented by the addition of claimant #2, is the following:
1. C is a commercial fisherman who relies for his business on
fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. C claims that oil from a spill
for which Oil Co. is responsible has polluted the waters in
which he fishes, and that he has been and will be unable to
fish for a period of time, resulting in lost profits.
2. CH is a man who makes his living supplying bait, tackle,
other necessary supplies, maintenance, and repairs to the
vessels of C and other fishermen like C. (In older maritime
terminology, people like CH were sometimes referred to as
"ships' chandlers."') CH claims that when the Oil Co. spill
prevented C and the others from fishing, CH's business
dried up.
3. H owns and operates a beachfront hotel in the Gulf area.
Oil from the Oil Co. spill has not reached the beachfront
that is owned by H and reserved for use by guests at H's
hotel. However, oil has been found in the immediate vicinity of H's hotel, including in waters that H's guests frequently use, and neighboring beaches that H's guests
routinely visit. H claims to have suffered a loss of business
because tourists, in light of the effects of the spill on the
immediate area in which his hotel is situated, have decided
to vacation elsewhere.
4. E is an employee at H's hotel. Because the hotel has lost
business, its managers have reduced staff hours by 25%, as a
result of which E has suffered and will suffer a 25% reduction in his wages for a certain period.
5. B owns a barge that is used to haul equipment and supplies up and down a small navigable river that runs to the
Gulf. Oil from the spill reaches the river, threatening migratory birds that live there. Authorities close the river to
boat traffic for three weeks to permit clean-up. B is unable
to operate his barge during this time and seeks recovery of
profits he would have made.
6. R operates a dockside restaurant located in a Gulf seaport. Its regular customers are dockworkers, fishermen, and
others whose jobs are connected with maritime commerce.
R claims that, because of the spill, the restaurant has lost
52. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 15.
53. See, e.g., Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90, 94 (1937) (referring to
the furnisher of loading/unloading services to a vessel as "similar . . . to . . . a ship's chandler").
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profits because many of the restaurant's regular customers
have not been frequenting it.
7. A is a real estate agent whose listings are made up primarily of beachfront properties in an area of the Gulf that has
been contaminated by the spill. She claims that the market
for property sales and rentals has collapsed because of the
spill, depriving her of commissions she otherwise would
have made.
8. W is a woodworker who owns a small furniture store located three miles inland in a town that relies on beach tourism as a major source of revenue. W claims that, because
some of the town's beaches have been polluted by the spill,
orders for his furniture are down and that he has lost profits
as a result.
9. 0 owns a beachfront inn located on the Gulf. No oil from
the spill has come within 100 miles of the waters or the
stretch of coastline on which the inn sits, and, at that location, the spill has had no other discernible adverse physical
effects (such as noxious odors). However, given prevailing
currents and winds, government officials and scientists have
concluded that oil might reach those waters and beaches
within a month. 0 claims to have suffered cancelled reservations and lost profits because of the credible threat of oil
pollution to the water and beaches adjacent to the inn.
10. F owns and operates a fireworks store that is situated
along the main interstate highway that leads to a set of Gulf
beaches, 150 miles north of those beaches. F relies on tourists traveling to and from the beaches for much of his business. F claims to have lost profits because of reduced tourist
traffic resulting from the Oil Co. spill.
11. T runs a tour boat that takes passengers along scenic
Gulf shoreline. No oil from the spill has come, or
threatened to come, within 400 miles of the area in which
Ts tours take place. T claims that, because of popular misimpressions about the scope of the spill, the spill has depressed tourism in the entire Gulf region, in turn causing T
to lose business and profits.
12. D owns an amusement park in a land-locked portion of
central Florida. Many of D's patrons are families that combine a trip to D's park with a beach vacation on Florida's
Atlantic Coast, which was never at risk of suffering pollution because of the spill. D claims that consumer unease
about traveling to Florida because of the spill has caused D
to suffer lost profits.
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13. N owns and operates a resort in Nevada. Each year for
the past decade, an association of Gulf-area fishermen has
held its annual meeting at N's facility. N claims that the
spill's economic effects have caused the association to cancel its plans to hold their convention at N's facility, in turn
causing N lost profits.
14. M, a company incorporated and operated in Hartford,
Connecticut, imports snorkeling equipment manufactured
in China. M claims that, because of the spill, snorkeling
equipment sales are down, resulting in lost profits.
15. S runs a seafood restaurant in Phoenix, Arizona. Although the seafood it serves is not from the Gulf, S claims
that it has lost profits because of general consumer fears
about contaminated seafood caused by the spill.
16. G owns a gas station in Boise, Idaho that sells Oil Co.brand gasoline. Although G owns and operates the station
as an independent franchise, his station becomes the target
of a boycott by a local environmental group demanding
greater corporate accountability. G claims lost income resulting from the boycott.
17. L runs a catering company based in New York City,
which is also the location of Oil Co.'s U.S. headquarters. L
claims that a substantial portion of her profits had previously come from catering events at Oil Co. headquarters,
but that she has lost revenues because Oil Co. has substantially cut back on catered events in the aftermath of the
spill.
Among the significant features of the foregoing "Universe" is its remarkable verisimilitude. None of the hypothesized claimants are difficult
to imagine, and none makes a silly or far-fetched argument. Assuming
they can prove what they allege, all the claimants have suffered economic
losses as a result of the spill. And Professor Goldberg demonstrates that
Congress conceivably could have made all of these claimants eligible: If
OPA had been enacted as it stands except without the "due to" clause in
Section 2702(b)(2)(E), "it would entail liability for all lost profits and impaired earning capacity resulting from a discharge." 5 4 Moreover, Goldberg
points out a theoretically possible interpretation of the "due to" clause that
would also probably bestow eligibility on the entire "Universe": If "due to"
were to "be read to set a threshold for economic loss liability that treats the
fact of any harm to any property or natural resources as a trigger for the
recovery of economic losses by any claimant," 55 then here again all of the
claimants in Goldberg's "Universe" would seem to be eligible for recovery.
54. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 17.
55. Id. at 18 (Goldberg's emphasis).
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But neither Professor Goldberg nor I think that the entire "Universe"
is eligible. 5 6 The subsections below indicate the exclusionary effects of the
factual causation interpretation of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) and of the
Goldberg use-right proposal.
A.

Claims Probably Defeated by Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s Factual
Causation Requirement

The factual causation interpretation that seems to emerge naturally
from the statute's language-a but-for connection between spill-produced
"injury, destruction, or loss" of property or natural resources and the
claimed-for economic losses-probably entitles the defendant Oil Co. to a
matter-of-law ruling against claimants 16 (the boycotted Boise gas station)
and 17 (the New York caterer). It seems unlikely that the existence of
"injury, destruction, or loss" of resources or property played any causal
role in producing these damages. Both the boycott and the catering cutback would probably have occurred as a result of the reputational effects of
the spill, regardless of whether the spill had actually produced any "injury,
destruction, or loss" of anything physical.
Claimants 11 through 15-geographically-remote tour boat operator,
notional Disney World, Nevada resort, Connecticut snorkel seller, Arizona
restaurant-are also likely losers under the factual causation interpretation
of Section 2702(b)(2)(E). The factual causation question in each case
would be whether the lost customers would have stayed away if somehow
the massive ugly spill had not yet been shown to have caused the "injury,
destruction, or loss" of anything physical. In some of these cases the claimant might conceivably reach the trier of fact with the assertion that the
spill's reputation would not alone have sufficed to turn away the customers.
But these all look more like skittish-customer situations, in which the customer behavior constituting the economic losses came about by reason of
the spill's ugly reputation without regard to its actual ugly effects.
B.

Claims That Should Succeed Under the Factual
Causation Interpretation

Cases 1 through 10 all involve claimants with highly plausible assertions that the losses in question would not have occurred if the spill had
caused no "injury, destruction, or loss" of natural resources or property.
Many of these claimants ought to be entitled to a matter-of-law ruling to
that effect. For example, the barge operator in case #5 would probably not
have been prevented from using the waterway if the spill had not polluted
the river to the extent necessary to threaten bird life.
56. The factual causation interpretation of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) excludes a number of classes of
claimants who would be entitled to recover under either of Professor Goldberg's two imaginary statutes
(one without the "due to" language and one with "due to" defined to mean "accompanied by"). On the
other hand, the factual causation interpretation includes a number of classes of claimants who would be
excluded by Professor Goldberg's proposed use-right requirement. Hence, it is accurate to call the
factual causation interpretation a middle-of-the-road viewpoint.
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C. Claims Defeated by the Goldberg Interpretation

Professor Goldberg says that his commercial-use-right doctrine would
clearly validate only claims 1, 3, and 4 (fishermen with polluted fishing
grounds, beachfront hotel surrounded by oil, and the hotel's employee). 7
Claimant 5 (the barge operator), Goldberg says, has a fairly good argument
but also some problems:
B [the barge owner] is not among those specifically mentioned in legislative history as entitled to recover. 8 Moreover, one could argue that access to navigable waters is a
right enjoyed generally by the public rather than the particular right of persons whose businesses happen to require
57. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 40. It is not clear how the hotel has a use-right, much less
the hotel employee. Professor Goldberg merely asserts that they do, providing no explanation.
58. Here Professor Goldberg is taking an overly narrow view of the legislative history. OPA's
legislative history is shot through with general statements indicative of congressional intent to authorize
recovery of "a broad class of damages." 135 CONG. REC. E842, (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Jones). See also S. REP. No. 101-94, supra note 11, at 12 ("These provisions are intended to
provide compensation for a wide range of injuries and are not so narrowly focused as to prevent victims
of an oil spill from receiving reasonable compensation."); 135 CONG. REc. H7893 (daily ed. Nov. 1,
1989) (statement of Rep. Quillen) ("full, fair, and swift compensation for everyone injured by oilspills";
"residents of States will be fully compensated for all economic damages"); 135 CONG.
REC. H7955
(daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Jones) ("an unlimited amount of recovery from the Federal
fund for all those who are injured by an oilspill"); 135 CONG. REC. H7959 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Tauzin) ("ensure that all victims are fully compensated"); 135 CONG. REC. H7964
(daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Hammerschmidt) ("ensure that all justified claims for compensation are satisfied"); 135 CONG. REC. H7969 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dyson)
("assurances that damages arising from spills will be completely compensated"); 135 CONG. REC.
H8140 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. Shumway) ("fund is designed to fully compensate all
victims"); 136 CONG. REC. H336 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Carper) ("ensure that those
people or those businesses that are damaged by these spills are fairly and adequately compensated");
136 CONG. REC. S7752 (daily ed. June 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) ("ensure the fullest possible compensation of oil spill victims"); 136 CONG. REc. H6260 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1990) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference) (polluters are "jointly, severally, and strictly liable for
removal costs and for a wide range of damages").
Classes of claimants specifically mentioned as entitled to protection included not only fishermen
and beachfront hotel owners but also fish "processing plant employees" and "those who work at the
companies depending on the fisheries" 135 CONG. REC. E1237 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Miller); "an employee at a coastal motel" 135 CONG. REC. H7898 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1989) (statement of Rep. Jones); "restaurant operators" 135 CONG. REC. H8263 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (statement
of Rep. Studds); "fishermen and others whose livelihood depended on the once-pristine waters" 135
CONG. REc. H8271(daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Slaughter); "local communities and private citizens that have to live with the oil fouled waters" 135 CONG. REc. H7968 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Dyson); "poor people in Alaska who have lost their jobs, their livelihood, their
homes, and the beautiful area in which they live" 135 CONG. REC. S9863 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); "those who depend on clean waters and coastlines for their livelihood" 135
CONG. REC. S9921 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Biden); "shell fishermen
and related
businesses" 136 CONG. RIC. E2109 (daily ed. June 21, 1990) (statement of Rep. Schneider); "shell
fishermen and dealers and processors, . . . beach concessionaires, and so forth" 136 CONG. RESC. E2109
(daily ed. June 21, 1990) (statement of Rep. Schneider); and "bait and tackle store owners." 136 CONG.
Rnc. E2109 (emphasis supplied). The concluding reference to "bait and tackle store owners" presumably includes the ships' chandler that Professor Goldberg's proposal would preclude from economic loss
recovery under OPA. See infra Part V1-D.
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use of navigable waters. 5 9 That fact-. .. could distinguish B's
claim from that of, for example, commercial fishermen who
possess a license to catch and sell fish.60
As for the rest on his list, Goldberg thinks his commercial-use-right
requirement would probably exclude claimants 6 through 8 (although "it
could conceivably be appropriate to interpret OPA generously to permit
these claims" 6 1) and would certainly exclude claimants 9 through 17.
D.

Goldberg Neglects the Ships' Chandler

Professor Goldberg's paper does not deal with claimant # 2, CH, the

ships' chandler whose pre-spill livelihood came from servicing and supplying fishing boats. The logic of Goldberg's commercial-use-right requirement would exclude this man; it is hard to see how the chandler could
plausibly argue that in earning his living in good times he established (in
Goldberg's terms) "a right to put [the ocean or its fish] to commercial
use." 6 2 (Moreover, if somehow CH could establish that he had a commercial-use-right in the ocean or the fish, then probably so could CH's employees and suppliers, whereupon the exclusion power of the user-right tool
would be lost.) Yet, the legislative history suggests that Congress pretty
clearly wanted to include CH (see, e.g., the reference to bait and tackle
stores in note 58), and intuitively CH seems almost as close to being in the
most obviously deserving class of claimants as the fishermen themselves.
Perhaps this is why Professor Goldberg's imagined "Universe" did not include him: By all rights CH ought to prevail but Goldberg's commercialuse-right tool will not allow it-and if it did, it would lose most of its exclusionary power.

VII.

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PROFESSOR GOLDBERG'S
RIGHT PROPOSAL

USE-

The Goldberg paper purports to find support for the commercial-useright requirement in OPA's language, 6 3 courts' treatment of analogous statutes, 64 "the common law regimes from which OPA departs, [OPA's] legislative history, judicial decisions interpreting OPA, and policy
59. Here Professor Goldberg seems to be suggesting, without directly saying so, that Congress
may have wanted to import limitations from the jurisprudence of public nuisance into the OPA remedy.
See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury
Rule, 28 ECOL. L.Q. 755 (2001); William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV.

997 (1966). Reviewing the legislative history of OPA leaves the strong impression that Congress could
hardly have had any such intention. See, e.g., supra note 58. Nor does Professor Goldberg point to any
statutory language that would support bringing limitations from the common law of public nuisance
into OPA.
60. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 40.
61. Id. at 42.
62. Id. at 3.
63. See infra Part VII-G.
64. See infra Part VII-A.
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considerations." 6 5 We have already seen that the crucial statutory language
claim is highly dubious, 6 6 and we will return to this matter in Part VII-G
below. First, we need to evaluate Professor Goldberg's other putative
sources.
A.

The Courts' Treatment of Statutes That Are Broadly
Analogous to OPA

Professor Goldberg repeatedly proclaims that his use-right proposal
does not entail reading anything into OPA that Congress did not put
there.6 7 But he seems to give away a big part of that game by urging in
support of his reading of OPA that it is "commonplace" for courts to read
proximate-cause limits into statutory cause-in-fact language. 68
The data Goldberg offers in support of his "commonplace" assertion
cannot bear the weight. He first treats two cases that arose under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA). 6 9 Neither case imposed a proximate cause or use-right limit
of the sort that Professor Goldberg contends for in his paper. The relevant
CERCLA provision in both cases was 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C), which
provides in pertinent part for the recovery of "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources . . . resulting from [the] release [of

oil or a hazardous substance]." The U.S. Department of the Interior issued
a regulation interpreting that provision to exclude recovery for harm to
"biological resources" when the claimed harm consisted of "biological responses that are caused predominately by other environmental factors such
as disturbance, nutrition, trauma, or weather. The biological response must
be a commonly documented response resulting from exposure to oil or hazardous substances." 0 In Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, the court upheld
the validity of the regulation, noting that the regulation did not address
"the causal link between the defendant's acts and the substance release"
but only "the causal link between the substance release and the biological
injuries alleged to have resulted from it." 7
United States v. Montrose Chemical Corp. was a cryptic decision order-

ing CERCLA plaintiffs to replead and stating that "plaintiffs must show
that a defendant's release of a hazardous substance was the sole or substantially contributing cause of each alleged injury to natural resources." 7 2 The
Montrose court did not cite the regulation but was apparently paraphrasing

it. In In re National Gypsum, the court refused to follow the Montrose
65. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 25.
66. See supra Part V-B.
67. See infra Part VII-G.
68. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 20.

69. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 and
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§# 9601-9675 (2002). For
Goldberg's treatment of the two CERCLA cases, see GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 21 & nn.44-45.
70. 43 C.F.R. § 11.62(f)(2) (i) (1986).
71. 880 F.2d 432, 471 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
72. 1991 WL 183147 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 1991).
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dictum because the Montrose court "cited no authority for that
proposition.""
There is no analysis of any sort in Montrose. In Ohio v. Dep 't ofInte-

rior, the court discussed CERCLA's language and particular legislative his74
tory at length before concluding that the regulation was valid. OPA's
language 7 5 and legislative history are dramatically different from CERCLA's.76 Moreover, while there are no federal regulations treating OPA's
economic loss provisions, the Commerce Department (National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA) has issued regulations on the
damages for harm to natural resources made available by OPA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(2)(A), and these are markedly more liberal than the Interior Department's CERCLA regulations. 7 In addition, the language of the regulation at stake in Ohio v. Dep't of Interior-as well as the language from
the court's opinion quoted two paragraphs above-may suggest that the
primary issue the court was focused on was factual, not proximate,
causation.7 8
Professor Goldberg's other data ostensibly supporting his claim that
courts routinely read statutory cause-in-fact language to include proximate
cause limitations are four cases decided under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
73. 1992 WL 426464 at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 24, 1992).
74. See 880 F.2d at 469-72.
75. OPA explicitly displaces the Robins/Testbank rule; CERCLA does not. See supra note 41.
76. Indeed, the legislative histories are opposites in an important sense. An early version of a bill
culminating in CERCLA included a provision that tort law's normal "cause in fact or proximate cause"
requirements would not apply in CERCLA cases; Congress took that out of the bill. 880 F.2d at 471.
An early version of a bill culminating in OPA provided that economic loss plaintiffs would have to
prove "proximate cause;" Congress took that out of the bill. See infra Part VII-D.
77. The Commerce Department (NOAA) regulations on OPA-provided damages for harm to
natural resources are at 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.10-990.66. Section 990.10 declares that OPA's purpose "is to
make the environment and public whole for injuries to natural resources and services." Section 990.13
establishes a rebuttable presumption that damages assessments made by governmental trustees-these
are the only proper plaintiffs in cases seeking damages under 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A)-are correct.
Section 990.14(a)(1) calls for "full restoration." Section 990.20(a) supersedes the CERCLA regulations
in relevant part. Section 990.25 says that claims for damages to natural resources can be settled only if
the settlement is adequate "to restore, replace, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of the injured
natural resources and services." Section 990.27 gives the trustees wide latitude on assessment procedures. Section 990.30 defines injury to mean "an observable or measurable adverse change in a natural
resource or impairment of a natural resource service. Injury may occur directly or indirectly to a natural resource and/or service." Section 990.51 gives the trustees wide latitude in determining and assessing the existence and extent of injury to resources. Section 990.53(c)(2) calls for full compensation for
the interim loss of natural resources and services pending recovery.
NOAA interprets its regulations to "authorize[] recovery of what are known as nonuse or 'passive'
losses, the value individuals place upon the existence of natural resources, even if they never plan to
make active use of them. In the case of the National Seashore, for example, people who have never
used the beach may nevertheless value its existence. To assess this value, researchers employ a survey
technique known as 'contingent valuation,' in which they create a hypothetical market and ask people-survey respondents-how much they would pay to preserve or protect a given resource." Gen.
Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The General Electric court
held that the availability of "passive value" damages was a valid interpretation of OPA.
78. Cf E. Tex. Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge, 453 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. 1970) (labeling the question
whether defendant's conduct was responsible for plaintiff's being struck by a thrown whiskey bottle an
issue of "proximate cause" and the question whether the impact with the bottle produced plaintiff's
chronic headaches a "causal connection" issue).
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Authorization Act (TAPAA). 7 9 The relevant TAPAA provision in these
cases was 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1)-this provision was repealed as part of
the OPA-enacting legislation 80-which stated:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, if oil that
has been transported through the trans-Alaska pipeline is
loaded on a vessel at the terminal facilities of the pipeline,
the owner and operator of the vessel (jointly and severally)
and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund . . . shall be

strictly liable without regard to fault in accordance with the
provisions of this subsection for all damages, including
clean-up costs, sustained by any person or entity, public or
private, including residents of Canada, as the result of discharges of oil from such vessel.
The court in In re Glacier Bay stated that "the plain language of Section
1653(c) is that all provable damages sustained by any person as a result of a
TAPS 1 oil spill are compensable and are not limited by established maritime law." 8 2 The court then held that the claims of fish tenders, fish spotters, fish processors, and other shoreside businesses were valid under the
TAPAA provision. The Glacier Bay case thus is antithetical to Professor
Goldberg's claim that proximate cause limitations have routinely been read
into TAPAA. (Moreover, in upholding the claims of fish processors and
shoreside businesses, the case speaks fairly loudly against any use-right
limit). Professor Goldberg states that the Ninth Circuit "subsequently rejected" Glacier Bay, but that's wrong; the Ninth Circuit case he cites did
not even mention Glacier Bay, and the KeyCite citator shows no negative
history on Glacier Bay."

Professor Goldberg can find a bit of support in the other three
TAPAA cases, but not much. The district court in In re Exxon Valdez said
in a footnote that the TAPAA "Congress did not abrogate all notions of
proximate cause," 84 but whatever such "notions" the court thought applicable were lenient enough to lead the court to conclude that a dealer in refrigeration units and a taxidermist had TAPAA claims that should not be
dismissed. The district court in Slaven v. BP America, Inc. cited no authority and provided no reasoning for its statement that, while "TAPAA does
79. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (2000). The four
relevant TAPAA cases are treated in GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 21-22 & nn.47, 48, 50. In his note 49,
Goldberg cites an irrelevant case, Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 665 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1981),
which involved a pipeline construction accident, a car wreck, and a TAPAA provision having nothing to
do with oil spills.
80. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 8102(a)(1), 104 Stat. 484, 485 (1990).
81. This is an acronym for Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. See In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp.
1379, 1382 n.1 (D. Alaska 1990).
82. Id. at 1386.
83. Three negative entries turn up on the WestLaw KeyCite citator, but all involved an irrelevant
point of federal civil procedure.
84. In re Exxon Valdez, 1993 WL 787392 at *3 n.15 (D. Alaska Dec. 23, 1993).
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not have an express proximate cause requirement[,] [i]t is beyond dispute
that . . . the common law requirement of proximate cause is implicitly in-

corporated."8 5 The Slaven court did not seem to use "the common law
requirement of proximate cause" against any TAPAA claimant, and in fact
it explicitly held that "the bright-line rule of Robins is not a necessary component of the proximate cause concept." 86 Here, as with Glacier Bay, the
court seemed averse to Goldberg's proposed use-right requirement. In
Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.," the Ninth Circuit thought that the efforts of Cal-

ifornia consumers to tie gasoline price increases (imposed by California refineries) to the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska were ridiculous; the court
claimed support in TAPAA's legislative history for the availability of a
proximate-cause-based "remote and derivative" analysis to throw the gasoline-price claims out. 88
Summing up the TAPAA cases: They do not seem to help Professor
Goldberg very much because several of them imply resistance to a useright limitation, and none used any kind of proximate cause limitation to
defeat any even half-way credible claimant. More importantly, they show
that TAPAA and OPA are very different with respect to both their relevant
language and their legislative histories. TAPAA included no two-step factual causation requirement of the sort that Congress built into OPA,8 9 perhaps thereby inclining the courts to look outside the statute for needed
controls. In addition, TAPAA's legislative history respecting its effect on
the Robins/Testbank rule was equivocal, 9 0 whereas OPA's is crystal clear;91
this meant that the TAPAA courts might conceivably have been more receptive to some kind of use-right requirement than would be appropriate
under OPA (but the TAPAA courts still resisted it).
It bears emphasis that, even if Professor Goldberg could convince us
that there is some kind of judicial pattern of reading statutory cause-in-fact
language to include proximate cause limitations, and that this pattern
should be carried into OPA despite OPA's seemingly carefully crafted twostep factual causation requirement, this would still provide no basis at all
for the use-right limitation that is the heart of Goldberg's argument.9 2 We
85. Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
86. Id. at 859.
87. 959 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 807-08.
89. See supra Part V-B; infra Part VII-G.
90. In Benefiel, the court punted on whether Robins/Testbank was displaced by TAPAA. See 959
F.2d at 807. In Slaven, the court said the relevant legislative history was "ambiguous." 786 F. Supp. at
858.
91. See supra Part V-A; supra note 58; infra Part VII-D.
92. Professor Goldberg seems to acknowledge that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2010) sets forth the normal meaning of proximate
cause as a "filter" that screens out "harms that are so haphazardly caused as to not count as the realization of one of the risks that rendered the actor's conduct careless." GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 20
cases by
n.41. See also id. at 22 n.49 (explaining that the proximate cause filter works in strict liability
limiting liability to "those harms that amount to the realization of the risks of the activity that lead the
law to regard the activity as appropriately subject to a rule of strict liability."). This has been the
sophisticated understanding of proximate cause for decades. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501
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saw in Part VI-A above that the OPA Congress intended to rip the Robins!
Testbank rule out of the law of OPA cases, root and branch. The use-right
requirement would be nothing more (or less) than a slightly flabby, slightly
blurry version of Robins/Testbank.
B.

The "Common Law Regimes from Which OPA Departs"

Federal maritime law's Robins/Testbank rule"-the rule that "there
[can] be no recovery for [negligently-caused] economic loss absent physical
injury to a proprietary interest [of the plaintiff]" 9 4-has counterparts in the
common law of most states. The most often-stated policy justification for
the rule is the "pragmatic one [that] the physical consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but the indirect economic repercussions of
negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually open-ended."9 5
Professor Goldberg's account of the pre-OPA common law takes maximum advantage of tort law's traditional leeriness toward non-physical
harm; Goldberg misses no opportunity to tie pre-OPA maritime and common law (and ultimately his proposed reading of OPA itself) as closely as
possible to "physical" criteria. 96 This campaign of extolling the inherent
F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (Cal. 1968) for the proposition
that "[d]efendant owes a duty, in the sense of a potential liability for damages, only with respect to
those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous, and hence negligent, in the first instance.").
Professor Goldberg's use-right requirement does not fit at all well into the inherently flexible and
case-specific common-law proximate cause concept. See Sinram v. Pa. R.R. Co., 61 F.2d 767, 771 (2d
Cir. 1932) (Learned Hand, J.) (extolling the inherent flexibility of the common law's approach to proximate cause and stating that the only alternative would be "a manual, mythically prolix, and fantastically
impractical"). Professor Goldberg's use-right requirement-together with his occasional inclinations to
abandon it (see infra note 186)-sometimes has the look of a mythically prolix manual.
93. See supra Part V-A.
94. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
95. Id. at 1022 (quoting Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused
by Negligence: A PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 45 (1972)). See also Harvey S. Perlman,
Interference With Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 70-72 (1982):
In cases of physical injury to persons or property, the task of defining liability limits is eased
. . . by the operation of the laws of physics. Friction and gravity dictate that physical objects
eventually come to rest. The amount of physical damage that can be inflicted by a speeding
automobile or a thrown fist has a self-defining limit. Even in chain reaction cases, intervening
forces generally are necessary to restore the velocity of the harm-creating object. These intervening forces offer a natural limit to liability.
The laws of physics do not provide the same restraints for economic loss. Economic relationships are intertwined so intimately that disruption of one may have far-reaching consequences.
Furthermore, the chain reaction of economic harm flows from one person to another without
the intervention of other forces. Courts facing a case of pure economic loss thus confront the
potential for liability of enormous scope, with no easily marked intermediate points and no
ready recourse to traditional liability-limiting devices such as intervening cause.
96. All of the emphasis in this footnote is supplied. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 3 (translating
Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s phrase "injury, destruction, or loss [of property or natural resources]" to require that the property or resources be "damaged, destroyed, or otherwise rendered physically unavailable"); id. at 3 (claiming that subsection E rules out tourist-trade losses "in areas physically unaffected
by a spill"); id. at 11 (asserting that subsection 2702(b)(2)(B)'s phrase "injury . . . or . . . destruction"
means "physical injury . . . or physical destruction"); id. at 18 (arguing that subsection (E) might support drawing distinctions between "physically harmless" and physical[1y] harmful" spills); id. at 22 (suggesting that Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992) limited damages under TAPAA
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priority of physical over economic harm eventually culminates with an argument that in both federal maritime law and state tort law, "the pure economic loss rule is. . . well-entrenched." 97 According to Professor Goldberg,
widely-cited decisions that have been seen as departures from the economic loss rule-that is, as having eschewed the requirement of physical
injury to a proprietary interest of the plaintiff-are actually little more than
"adjustments" 9 8 that allow recovery in a few special situations that lie "at
or just beyond the [rule's] margins." 99 Thus, in Goldberg's view,100 the federal maritime law decision in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen'0 ' and the state tort
law decisions in Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College,1 0 2 J'Aire Corp. v.
Gregory,10 3 and People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.'0 4

all involved nothing more than "push[ing] the boundaries of the economic
loss rule" 0 5 so as to "expand[ ] liability for economic loss beyond owners
and lessees of property [i.e., those with a proprietary interest in property]
to damages arising out of "the physical effects of oil discharges"); id. at 22 n.49 (asserting that § 20(a) of
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (2010) limits
strict liability to "instances of physical harm"); id. at 26 (characterizing the Robins and Testbank decisions as drawing a sharp distinction between economic loss and "physical damage"); id. at 28 (asserting
that economic interests "warrant[] less . . . legal protection than does the interest of a person in the
physical integrity of her person or possessions"); id. at 29 (stating that the law needs "to prioritize
claims for physical injury and property damage over claims for lost profits"); id. at 32 (arguing that the
subsection E phrase "injury, destruction, or loss of [property], or natural resources" requires a claimant
to show that his or her "business's profitability depends on his or her ability to exercise a right physically to obtain or use property or resources that are [physically] damaged or lost because of an oil
spill"); id. at 32 (translating subsection E's phrase "injury, destruction, or loss" to mean "damaged or
made physically unavailable"); id. at 36 (arguing that the law generally requires "claims for [physical]
personal injury and property damage . . . to be prioritized" ahead of economic loss claims); id. at 36
(asserting that communities with property or resources "that have been physically harmed or rendered
unusable by a spill" are intrinsically worse off than communities with other types of spill-caused economic losses); id. at 38 (arguing that claimants with losses caused by a spill's repugnant reputation are
better able to protect themselves than those with economic "losses caused by physical damage to property or resources").
It should be noted Professor Goldberg's claim, id. at 22 n.49, that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (2010) limits strict liability to instances of
physical harm is potentially misleading. The Foreword to this Restatement makes clear that it does not
address economic harm at all, and it is generally known that Professor Ward Farnsworth is presently
working as Reporter of a contemplated Restatement comprehensively dealing with economic harm. Id.
at xi-xii.
97. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 29.
98. Id. at 29.
99. Id. at 30.
100. See id. at 29-32 & nn.66, 68.
101. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that commercial fishermen have a cause of action
against polluters for negligent interference with their livelihood).
102. 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987) (holding that a plumbing contractor had a cause of action against
those who impaired the contractor's employees' capability of performing their duties by negligently
injuring them).
103. 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) (holding that a lessee of premises with no proprietary right in the
premises had a cause of action against a negligent repairer of the premises for interfering with the
lessee's right of occupancy). The facts of J'Aire are closely parallel to those of Robins Dry Dock, supra
note 36.
104. 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985) (holding that an airline forced to evacuate its undamaged premises
because of defendants' negligence in creating the risk of an explosion had a cause of action for interference with the airline's business operations).
105. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 32.
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that has been damaged to any person whose business's profitability depends on his or her ability to exercise a right physically to obtain or use
property or resources that are [negligently] damaged . . . or made physically
unavailable."1 06 To say the same thing another way, Goldberg believes that
these crucially important pre-OPA decisions came nowhere near abandoning the requirement of a physical harm to a proprietary interest of the
plaintiff but instead merely expanded the proprietary interest concept to
include those with "legally protected interest[s] in.

.

. certain property that

fall[ ] [only a bit] short of outright ownership." 0 7 Thus, Professor
Goldberg manages to characterize important decisions that depart from
Robins/Testbank as having accomplished very little-as merely relaxing the
propriety-interest requirement only slightly and substituting a quasi-proprietary-interest or quasi-physical-interest requirement. 08
106. Id. at 32.
107. Id. at 30. Professor Goldberg seems to get a bit carried away with this claim, stating (without
citing any authority) that even in jurisdictions that have disavowed the Robins/Testbank rule, "the pattern of actual liability. . . overwhelmingly limits liability to instances in which careless conduct renders
particular property unusable by persons who have a right and a commercial need to use it, which right is
exclusive to those persons, or least held only by a limited class of right-holders." Id. at 31.
108. Professor Goldberg's account of the four key cases drastically and skillfully narrows each of
them to fit his purposes. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen held that commercial fishermen-who clearly have no
"proprietary interest" in the fish they hope to catch-have a cause of action under federal maritime law
for negligent injury to their livelihood and cited Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953), for the
proposition that the fishermen are not subject to "the teaching of Robins Dry Dock." 501 F.2d 558,
560, 567 (9th Cir. 1974). Carbone in turn cited a number of cases antedating Robins Dry Dock for the
proposition that commercial fishermen are "seamen [who] are the favorites of admiralty and [whose]
economic interests [are] entitled to the fullest possible legal protection. These considerations have
given . . . rise to a special right comparable to that of a master to sue for the loss of services of his
servant, or the right of a husband or father to sue for the loss of services of wife or child." Carbone, 209
F.2d at 182. The Carbone court added that "it must be assumed that Mr. Justice Holmes, who wrote the
opinion in [Robins, supra note 36], was familiar" with the fishermen's rule and yet gave no indication
"of an intention to reverse" it. Id. at 181. Professor Goldberg was able to find some use-right language
in Oppen, but the decision's principal thrust was toward the inapplicability of the Robins rule to the
situation of commercial fishermen rather than the much narrower view of the case taken by Goldberg.
The Goldberg paper seeks to narrow not just the meaning and breadth of applicability of the
fishermen's rule but also to undermine its pedigree, indicating at several points that the Fifth Circuit has
never recognized the rule. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 29 n.66, 31 n.72. This seems to be a mistake
on Goldberg's part; in In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd., 444 F.3d 371, 378 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006), the court said
that in Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1027 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) "we
recognized the argument in favor of an exception for commercial fishermen, but left the contours of
such an exception for another day because the claims of the commercial fishermen were not before us."
Professor Goldberg's paper also repeatedly claims that the Supreme Court has never recognized
the fishermen's rule. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 31 n.72, 33. While this claim cannot be termed a
mistake, it is highly debatable. In E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., the court noted the
existence of the fishermen's rule without approving or disapproving it, stating that "courts . . . at times
have provided special protection for fishermen." 476 U.S. 858, 869 n.5 (1986) (citing Carbone). In
Idaho v. Oregon, Justice O'Connor-joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens in dissent-seemed to
approve the fishermen's rule in stating: "[C]ourts have long recognized the opportunity to fish as an
interest of sufficient dignity and importance to warrant certain protections." 462 U.S. 1017, 1030 (1983)
(emphasis in original). As examples, Justice O'Connor cited with evident approval two cases applying
the fishermen's rule-the Ninth Circuit's Oppen decision and Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V Testbank,
524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981).
In similar fashion, the Goldberg paper seeks to narrow the meaning and breadth of the three state
law decisions diverging from Robins!/Testbank, each of which is written in broad language repudiating
the economic loss rule. (Goldberg acknowledges that People Express and J'Aire "purported to reject
the reconomic loss] rule outright," going on to characterize the decisions' results as narrow.
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Goldberg's View of the Extent of OPA 'sDeparturefrom The
Common Law Regimes

C

As we have just seen, Professor Goldberg manages to read Oppen,

Mattingly, J'Aire, and People Express as resting on use-right reasoning.109

It is then marvelously easy for him to slide into an argument that OPA
ought to be read the same way. This argument runs as follows:
Congress's aim in enacting Section 2702(b)(2)(E) was
[probably] to extend liability along the lines tentatively
identified by [the] judicial decisions that have pushed the
boundaries of the economic loss rule. To say the same
thing: OPA's economic loss provisions are best understood
as expanding liability for economic loss beyond owners and
lessees of property that [has] been damaged to any person
whose business's profitability depends on his or her ability
to exercise a right physically to obtain or use property or
resources that are damaged or lost because of an oil
spill.... Reading OPA in this manner makes sense of the
"due to" clause's linkage of recovery for economic loss to
property or resources being damaged or made physically
unavailable. Economic loss is "due to" property or resource
supra note 2, at 30.) See People Express, 495 A.2d at 111 (emphatically rejecting the physical harm requirement as "capriciously shower[ing] compensation along the path of physical destruction," as "discordant with contemporary tort doctrine," and as "unnecessarily or arbitrarily
foreclos[ing] redress based on formalisms or technicalisms"); Mattingly, 743 P.2d at 359-61 (enthusiastically adopting and endorsing the reasoning of People Express and quoting it at length); J'Aire, 598 P.2d
at 64 (recognizing a cause of action for "negligent interference with prospective economic advantage,"
stating that its decision was "consistent with the recent trend in tort cases," criticizing the economic loss
rule as "overly rigid," and noting that "injury to a tenant's business can often result in greater hardship
than damage to a tenant's person or property").
Professor Goldberg also disparages the pedigree of the three state-law decisions, calling People
Express a "lonely outpost" and implying that this is true of Mattingly and J'Aire as well. GOLDBERG,
supra note 2, at 30 n.69 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But in its two most recent
characterizations of People Express, the Supreme Court of New Jersey extolled the decision as exemplary of "[t]he creativity and flexibility of the [common law]" and as a demonstration that New Jersey's
"tort law . . . has always recognized that the burden of loss should fall, as a matter of justice, on the
party at fault." Ruiz v. Mero, 917 A.2d 239, 243-44 (N.J. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Franklin Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jersey Cent. P. & L. Co., 902 A.2d 885, 887 (N.J. 2006). The Alaska
Supreme Court recently characterized Mattingly as having "rejected the [entire] distinction between
physical and economic losses." C.P. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 1216, 1222 n.32 (Alaska 2000). The
most recent California Supreme Court case mentioning J'Aire states with apparent approval that "[t]he
lower courts have applied the theory of liability articulated in J'Aire" and "have also expanded upon
J'Aire." Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1136 (Cal. 2000).
109. See supra Part VII-B. See also GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 29 (quoting Oppen language
describing commercial fishermen as "lawfully and directly mak[ing] use of a resource of the sea" and
stating that "[t~his type of use is entitled to protection from negligent conduct"); id. at 30 (characterizing People Express and J'A ire as involving "careless interference with a legally protected interest in the
use of certain property that falls short of outright ownership"); id. at 30-31 (characterizing People
Express and J'Aire as "granting to persons with use-rights in certain property the power to sue for
economic losses caused by careless acts that damage the property or render it unavailable"); id. at 31
(characterizing all four of the decisions as limited to "instances in which careless conduct renders particular property unusable by persons who have a right and a commercial need to use it, which right is
exclusive to those persons, or at least held only by a limited class of right-holders").
GOLDBERG,
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damage, or loss, when profits or earnings suffer because the
damage, or loss, prevents or hinders the claimant from putting that property or those resources to commercial use, as
is her right.'o
Professor Goldberg acknowledges the criticism "that OPA, so read,
accomplishes very little because it merely replicates schemes of liability already in place under admiralty law and state tort law." 11 His answer to
this criticism is merely to reiterate that the aim of Section 2702(b)(2)(E)
was probably to guarantee the applicability of the use-right principle in the
marine pollution context, while perhaps broadening that principle just a

bit.112

D.

OPA's Legislative History

The Goldberg paper's short section treating OPA's legislative history
makes only one significant point-that members of Congress, the House
Conference Report, and a Senate Report repeatedly instanced commercial
fishermen and beachfront property owners as the most obvious beneficiaries of Section 2702(b)(2)(E)." 3 But we have already seen that the Senate Report said the provision was meant to compensate "a wide range of
injuries" and that many members of Congress enumerated a number of
other types of beneficiaries, including seafood "dealers and processors, bait
and tackle store owners, beach concessionaires, and so forth."' 14 Moreover, there are nine features of the legislative history-features that Professor Goldberg's paper largely ignores" 5-that, taken in the aggregate, seem
devastating to the Goldberg interpretation of Section 2702(b)(2)(E). In
thinking about these nine features, we should keep in mind that the
Goldberg proposal finds in the "due to" clause of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) a
"proximate cause"116 limit requiring economic loss claimants to "prove that
they have suffered economic loss because a spill has damaged, destroyed or
otherwise rendered physically unavailable to them property or resources
that they have a right to put to commercial use." 1 ' 7
First, Section 2702(b)(2)(E) includes no explicit use-right limitation.
But Section 2702(b)(2)(C) does; it requires a subsistence-use claimant to
show that he "uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed,
or lost." The first of two powerful statutory-construction canons set forth
in Russello v. United States is this:
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 32.

Id.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33-34.
Supra note 58.
But see infra notes 127 and 137.
GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 20.
Id. at 3.
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Where Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.18
At an otherwise unrelated point in his paper, Professor Goldberg insists
that the Russello canon is not applicable "where provisions in the same
statute are distinctively formulated," 1 19 but it is hard to see how he could so
characterize subsections C and E of Section 2702(b)(2). Indeed, Goldberg
explicitly acknowledges that subsections C and E are "counterpart[s]."1 20
It thus seems obvious that the first Russello canon speaks powerfully
against reading a use-right limitation into Section 2702(b)(2)(E).
Second, three of the bills that eventually coalesced to become OPA
include explicit use-right limitations in their economic loss provisions.121
As the bills made their way through the legislative process, the use-right
limitations were deleted; no explanation has been found.12 2 Russello's second statutory-construction canon is the following:

118. 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Hardt v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010) (holding that because 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(2) has an explicit "prevailing party" limit on court-awarded attorneys' fees in ERISA cases
whereas 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) does not, reading a "prevailing party" limit into the latter provision
would "more closely resemble[I inventing a statute rather than interpreting one") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Under the Hardt analysis, Professor Goldberg's reading of a use-right limit

into OPA Section 2702(b)(2)(E) amounts to inventing a statute.
119. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 21 n.42. See also infra notes 127-128.
120. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 34.
121. As introduced by the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on March 16, 1989,
H.R. 1465 provided in § 102(a)(2)(B)(v) for "Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of
earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural
resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant who derives at least 25 percent of his or her
earnings from the activities which utilize such property or natural resources, or, if such activities are
seasonal in nature, 25 percent of his or her earnings during the applicable season." As introduced by
the House Public Works and Transportation Committee on May 11, 1989, H.R. 2325 provided in
§ 102(a)(3)(D) for "Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the
injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant who derives
at least 25 per centum of his or her earnings from the activities which utilize such natural resources, or,
if such activities are seasonal in nature, 25 per centum of his or her earnings during the applicable
season." On July 27, 1989, H.R. 3027 (supported by the House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology) was introduced; § 102(a)(2)(B)(v) provided for "Damages equal to the loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity (based on prior profits and earnings) due to the injury, destruction, or
loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources. Such damages shall be recoverable by
any claimant who derives at least 25 percent of his or her earnings from the activities which utilize such
property or natural resources, or, if such activities are seasonal in nature, 25 percent of his or her
earnings during the applicable season."
122. H.R. REP. NO. 101-241, Part 1 (to accompany H.R. 3027) was issued on September 13, 1989,
showing the use-right limitation still in that bill. Part 2 of that Report, issued on September 18, 1989, to
accompany H.R. 1465, shows the use-right limitation still in that bill. But on October 13, 1989, H.R.
3394 was introduced and explained as a composite bill, designed to merge the others. Section
1002(b)(2)(E) of that bill has the language that was enacted as OPA Section 1002(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(2)(E)-language shorn of any version of a use-right requirement.
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Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be
presumed that the limitation was not intended. 123
This is a second heavy strike against reading a use-right limitation into Section 2702(b)(2)(E).
Third, OPA's predecessor legislation included a use-right limit. Title
III of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978124 provided for the recovery of pollution-caused economic loss damages "due to
injury to, or destruction of, real or personal property or natural resources . . . if the claimant derives at least 25 per centum of his earnings

from activities which utilize the property or natural resource." 125 OPA repealed these provisions, 1 2 6 replacing them with Section 2702(b)(2)(E).
Here is the third strike against reading a use-right limitation into Section
2702(b)(2)(E). It seems very plain that the OPA Congress did not want a
use-right limit.
Fourth, neither Section 2702(a) nor Section 2702(b)(2)(E) includes
any mention of "proximate cause." But Section 2704(c)(1)-specifying
types of conduct that will expose a polluter to liability for damages above
the OPA damages caps-requires the spill in question to be "proximately
caused" by such conduct. This shows that Congress knew how to say
"proximate cause" when it wanted to require that. Here again, the disparate formulation of two related sections of the same statute calls for the
application of the first Russello canon, which teaches that Congress presumptively meant to require a showing of proximate cause for cap-breaking
purposes but not for the imposition of liability. Applying that presumption
here would make complete sense: Congress evidently decided that polluters deserve the protection of a proximate cause requirement when being
sued for damages above the cap, but not for basic liability-imposing
purposes.
Professor Goldberg tries to answer this fourth point with a badly
flawed footnote that completely mischaracterizes the essence of Section
2704(c)(1). Goldberg erroneously says that "Section 2704(c)(1) employs
the phrase 'proximately caused' in specifying the limited circumstances in
which a responsible party can disclaim liability for damages," 12 7 whereas
the section has the completely opposite thrust of specifying conduct that
will expose a responsible party to additional liability above the damages
caps. This surprising mistake robs the remainder of Professor Goldberg's
footnote of intelligibility: When Goldberg says that the first Russello canon
should not apply to the difference between Sections 2702 and 2704 because
the two sections are "formulated in a fundamentally different manner"
123. 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983).
124. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
125. Id,§§ 303(a)(2)(E), 303(b)(4).
126. See Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 2004 (1990).
127. GOLDBERG, supra note 2,at 20 n.42.
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from one another, 128 he is talking about an imaginary Section 2704(c)(1),
not the one actually on the books.
Fifth, the second Russello canon-that Congress's deletion of limiting
language in a bill before enacting it justifies presuming that the limitation
was not intended-applies to the proximate cause point in much the same
way as to the use-right point. Several of the early versions of the bills that
became OPA included language requiring parties seeking pollution damages to show proximate causation.129 As was true respecting the use-right
language, the proximate cause language was also deleted as the bills made
their way toward passage.1 30 Therefore, Russello counsels us to conclude
that the OPA Congress did not want to require claimants seeking economic
loss damages to meet a proximate cause requirement.
Sixth, OPA's predecessor legislation included an explicit proximate
cause limit. Title III of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 19781'1 provided for the recovery of pollution-caused damages
that were "proximately caused by the discharge of oil from an offshore
133
facility or vessel."1 32 OPA repealed this provision, replacing it with Section 2702(a). So here again, the second Russello canon calls for the presumption that the OPA Congress did not intend a proximate cause limit to
be read into its economic loss provisions.
Seventh, all of the House of Representatives bills that coalesced into
OPA included direct-causation requirements. 134 The bill that passed the
House of Representatives included such a limit. 135 But (without any discoverable explanation) the directness requirement was deleted from the
bill that emerged from the House-Senate conference and was signed into
law.' 3 6 Here once again, the second Russello canon requires a presumption
that the OPA Congress intended that for purposes of recovering economic
128. Id. at 21 n.42.
129. See H.R. 3027, 101st Cong. § 102(a)(1) (1989) (limiting recoverable damages to those "which
are proximately caused by" a spill or substantial threat of a spill); H.R. 1465 as presented in H.R. REP.
101-242, pt. I, § 102(a)(1) (1989) (same).
130. H.R. 3394, the composite bill introduced on October 3, 1989, included no explicit proximate
cause requirement in its liability-imposing and economic-loss provisions. Nor did the version of H.R.
1465 that passed the House of Representatives in November 9, 1989. Nor, of course, does the enacted
law.
131. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
132. Id. at § 301(15).
133. See Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 2004 (1990).
134. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong. § 102(a) (as passed by House on Mar. 16, 1989) (limiting recoverable damages to those "that arise out of or directly result from" a spill or substantial threat of a spill);
H.R. 2325, 101st Cong. § 102(a) (1989) (limiting recoverable damages to those "that arise out of or
directly result from such discharge or threat of discharge"); H.R. 3027, 101st Cong. § 102(a)(1) (1989)
(limiting recoverable removal costs to those "which arise out of or directly result from" a spill or substantial threat of a spill); H.R. 3394, 101st Cong. § 1002(a)(1) (Oct. 3, 1989) (limiting recoverable removal costs and damages to those "that directly result from" a spill or substantial threat of a spill).
135. See H.R. 1465, 101st Cong. § 1002(a)(1) (1989) (limiting recoverable removal costs and damages to those "that directly result from" a spill or substantial threat of a spill).
136. See H.R. REP. No. 101-653 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (presenting §1002(a) of H.R. 1465 as providing for liability for removal costs and damages "that result from" a spill or substantial threat of a spill;
the language is identical to the enacted Section 2702(a)).
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loss damages, the only causation requirement should be factual
causation.13 7
Eighth, OPA's predecessor legislation included a direct-causation requirement. Title III of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978138 provided for the recovery of pollution-related damages

"by any person suffering any direct and actual injury proximately caused by
the discharge of oil from an offshore facility or vessel."' 3 9 OPA repealed
this provision,14 0 replacing it with Section 2702(a), which contains no "directness" or "proximate cause" language. Here we have yet another application of the second Russello canon.
Ninth, as we saw in Part V-B above, Goldberg's insistence that the
OPA terms "result[ing] from" (Section 2702(a)) and "due to" (Section
2702(b)(2)(E)) have different meanings is flatly contradicted by the House
Conference Report, which in its provision-by-provision analysis of the
House-passed bill stated: "Subsection (b)(2)(E) provides that any claimant
may recover for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting
from [the statutory term is "due to"] injury to property or natural resources." 14 1 Here we have an authoritative statement by Congress that
"resulting from" and "due to" are synonyms. It is hard to resist calling this
the final nail in the coffin for Goldberg's use-right reading of subsection
(b)(2)(E).
E.

Judicial Decisions Interpreting OPA

Professor Goldberg's paper presents seven decisions that have involved the relevant OPA provisions.1 42 Economic loss claimants prevailed
in four of these, and Goldberg does not question these results.' 4 3 Dunham137. Professor Goldberg acknowledges the deletion of the "directness" requirement from the final
bill, but he argues that his reading of Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due to clause" as an "explicit[ ]" limitation going beyond "actual causation" should trump the Russello canon. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 17
n.36.
138. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
139. Id. at § 301(15).
140. See Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 2004 (1990).
141. H.R. REP. No. 101-653, at 104 (emphasis supplied).
142. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 17 n.36, 34-35.
143. Goldberg discusses these four cases id. at 34-35 & n.85. In FGDI, L.L. C v. M/V Lorelay, the
operators of a vessel that spilled oil while berthed in the Port of Mobile conceded liability under OPA
to the operator of a grain elevator that could not use its loading berth while the area was being cleaned.
193 Fed. App'x 853, 2006 WL 2351835 (11th Cir. 2006). As is explained supra note 15, Settoon and
Sekco held that owners of undamaged property (like claimants who owned no spill-involved property)
have causes of actions under Section 2702(b)(2)(E). Dunham-Priceis discussed in the text immediately
following this footnote signal.
At 35 & n.83, Professor Goldberg takes an unwarranted liberty with the Sekco opinion; he claims
that in a passage at 820 F. Supp. 1012 "the court emphasized [that] defendant's interference with the
plaintiff's right to operate its [undamaged] platform is exactly the sort of interference-with-use-rights
that Section 2702(b)(2)(E) addresses." This claim distorts Sekco; the cited passage did not address
OPA at all but was the court's tentative recognition that interference with a property owner's "right of
use" might properly be viewed as harm to a proprietary interest for purposes of the Robins!/Testbank
rule. When the Sekco court eventually turned its attention to OPA, it said the platform owner had no
claims under subsections (B) and (C) of Section 2702(b)(2) but did have a viable claim under subsection (E):
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Price Group, LLC v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.i4 is especially instructive. An

oil spill from Citgo's refinery into the Calcasieu River caused the Coast
Guard to order a temporary closure of twenty-two miles of the river, which
interfered with the business operations of Dunham's concrete facility "located several miles upriver from Citgo's refinery and upriver from the zone
closed by the Coast Guard." 145 Citgo responded to Dunham's claim for
damages under Section 2702(b)(2)(E) by moving for summary judgment
and making the following argument:
Citgo argues that under [Section 2702(b)(2)(E)], a plaintiff
must prove that his injuries are directly "due to" property
damage resulting from an oil discharge. Citgo further argues that Dunham Price's damages are due to the closure of
the Calcasieu Ship Channel and not attributable to a physical injury to property or natural resources. 1 4 6
Note that Citgo was making a proximate cause/physical injury argument
closely resembling Professor Goldberg's proposed reading of Section
2702(b)(2)(E). Dunham responded to Citgo's argument by directing the
court's attention to Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s actual language, "insist[ing]
that the statute does not mention or require a direct causal link between a
claimant's economic losses and damages to property or natural

resources."1 4 7
The Dunham-Pricecourt accepted Dunham's statutory-language argument. The court denied Citgo's summary judgment motion and expressed
its disagreement with Citgo's proximate cause argument:
The Calcasieu River meets OPA's definition of a natural resource [quoting 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20)]. Citgo has admitted
that its discharge of oil into the Calcasieu River polluted a
navigable water of the United States and damaged the personal property of owners along the Calcasieu River. Moreover, the Coast Guard issued a community advisory,
notifying the public of the spill and the subsequent closure
of the Calcasieu River. Dunham Price has submitted evidence demonstrating genuine issues of material fact, so it
Plaintiff alleges that the Isopar M spill caused a loss of future production revenues. Future
earnings derived from drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf constitute property, but whether
that property be real or personal is irrelevant; in either case, plaintiff can recover for loss of
profits. Given the language of subsection (E), the Court cannot say as a matter of law that
plaintiff has no cause of action here.
Sekco, 820 F. Supp. at 1015.

144.
145.
146.
147.

2010 WL 1285446 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010).
at *1.
Id.
Id.at*2.
Id.
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will be for the trier of fact to determine whether Dunham
Price's economic losses are due to Citgo's oil spill. 148
It will be noted that there is nothing particularly remarkable about the
facts, arguments, and judicial reasoning in Dunham-Price. The remarkable
thing is the court's rejection of a version of Professor Goldberg's central
argument.
The Goldberg paper treats three decisions with results adverse to OPA
claimants. As Professor Goldberg comes close to acknowledging,1 49 two of
them are pretty clearly wrong. The widely-criticized 5 o decision in In re
Cleveland Tankers, Inc. denied recovery to plaintiffs making claims under
Section 2702(b)(2)(E) because they failed to "allege[ ] 'injury, destruction,
or loss' to their property."' This is flatly wrong, as is shown by the provision itself ("recoverable by any claimant") and by the language of the
House Conference Report quoted supra at notes 39-40.152
Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States'5 3 seems almost as clearly wrong. Gatlin owned above-ground fuel storage tanks that were jammed open by vandals, causing oil to spill into ditches leading to navigable waters as well as a
fire (ignited by the oil's vapors) that destroyed a large part of Gatlin's
property. One member of the Fourth Circuit panel agreed with the trial
judge that the fire damage was compensable under OPA Sections 2702(a)
and 2702(b)(2)(B) because (in the language of Section 2702(a)) the fire
damage "result[ed] from" the spill incident.154 But the two-judge Fourth
Circuit majority disagreed, holding that the fire damage was not compensable "because the evidence did not establish that the fire caused the discharge of oil into navigable waters or posed a substantial threat to do
so." 155 It must be respectfully said that this reasoning makes no sense, and
Professor Goldberg does not pretend that it does: He says that the majority's reasoning was "somewhat obscure[ ]."156
148. Id. at *3.
149. See infra notes 152 and 156.
150. See In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd., 444 F.3d 371, 382 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Cleveland Tankers
as contrary to prevailing views, including the Fifth Circuit's own, on the meaning of Section
2702(b)(2)(E)); Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 n.6 (1st Cir. 1994) (criticizing
Cleveland Tankers for ignoring the fact that OPA "override[s]" the Robins/Testbank rule); Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 769 n.75 (Alaska 1999) (criticizing Cleveland Tankers for
failing to recognize that OPA provides for the recovery of economic damages); Francis J. Gonynor, Six
Years Before the Mast: The Evolution of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 105, 127

(1996) (stating that Cleveland Tankers "interpreted OPA in a novel way").
151. 791 F. Supp. 669, 678 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (emphasis supplied).

152. Professor Goldberg cites Cleveland Tankers as interpreting OPA Section 2702(b)(2)(E) more

narrowly than he thinks proper. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 35 n.81. Goldberg suggests that maybe
the Cleveland Tankers plaintiffs-who were complaining of the blockage of a channel they used for
transporting goods-lost the case because they did not have licenses to use the waterway. Id. at 40 n.92.
153. 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999).
154. See id. at 215 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he statutory [2702(a)] test-whether
fire damage 'resulted from' the discharge of oil that threatened to pollute navigable waters-was .. .

satisfied").

155. Id. at 212.
156. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 17 n.36.
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57
The case that Professor Goldberg makes the most of' is In re Taira
Lynn Marine Ltd.,158 but the case does not seem particularly instructive on
any of the matters in contention here. The Taira plaintiffs sought businessinterruption and similar economic damages brought about by the
mandatory evacuation of their areas of operation that was necessitated
when a barge ran into a bridge and discharged its cargo-"a gaseous mixture of propylene/propane"-into the air.'5 9 Nothing was spilled into the
water or onto the shoreline. Because the OPA damages provisions are limited to situations in which "oil is discharged, or [there is a] substantial

threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining

shorelines or the exclusive economic zone," 16 0 Taira was fairly clearly not
an OPA case. As was explained by the court in Dunham-Price:
The Fifth Circuit found that OPA claims are limited to damages resulting "from a discharge of oil or from a substantial
threat of a discharge of oil into navigable waters or the adjacent shoreline." Taira Lynn Marine, 444 F.3d at 383 (quoting Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207, 211 (4th

Cir. 1999)). Although OPA did not apply to the discharge
of gaseous cargo, the court considered it applicable for the
sake of argument. Id.161
In its "for the sake of argument" discussion of OPA, the Taira court characterized Section 2702(b)(2)(E) as "allow[ing] a plaintiff to recover for eco62
nomic losses resulting from damage to another's property"1 and went on
to state that the provision would not afford relief to the plaintiffs because
they "have not raised an issue of fact as to whether their economic losses
are due to damage to [anyone's] property resulting from the discharge of
the gas."' 63 The plaintiffs should have been arguing that the discharge of
the gas polluted the air (which OPA includes within its expansive definition
of "natural resources"1 6 4 ) and thus constituted "injury, destruction, or loss
of ... natural resources" within the meaning of Section 2702(b)(2)(E). But
if that point was made, the Fifth Circuit completely ignored it.
For one looking to Taira for lessons about the meaning of Section
2702(b)(2)(E), the returns (to borrow an apt Goldberg phrase) seem "vanishingly small."165 The court indicated that OPA did not apply, but that if it
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
economic

See id. at 35 n.81, 40 n.92.
444 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 376.
33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (emphasis supplied).
Dunham-Price, 2010 WL 1285446 at *2 n.6 (w.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010).
444 F.3d at 382.
Id. at 383.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20).
See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 19 (arguing that the probability of an oil spill that causes
loss but no physical damage to anything is "theoretical but vanishingly small").
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did, the part of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) allowing a claimant to recover economic losses for damage to someone else's property would not help plaintiffs who had no evidence that the oil (or oil-based chemical) spill had
damaged anyone's property. The case is no help at all on the sphere of
application of the portion of Section 2702(b)(2)(E)-surely the more important portion-providing for economic damages flowing from injury to
the environment.
F. Policy Considerations

1. Statutory-Construction Principles and Policies
Professor Goldberg's three-page subsection labeled "Policy Considerations"' 6 6 includes some but not nearly all of the paper's policy arguments.
These begin much earlier in the paper with the maxim that "[t]he search for
an answer [to whether OPA requires economic loss claimants to establish
proximate causation] must ... begin with the plain terms of the statute."1 67
In conventional thinking, this concept is perhaps more often seen as a principle rather than a policy, but it ultimately rests on the judicial branch's
goal of affording (or at least seeming to afford) deference to the legislative
branch. 168 As the Supreme Court recently put it:
[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to
one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time
and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says

there.169

Another way to say this is that when a statute is clear, it should be applied
honestly and carefully, without embellishment or evasion.170
Professor Goldberg endorses the foregoing policy-indeed, he repeatedly proclaims his fidelity to it' 7 -but his goal of finding a proximate
cause/use-right limitation in Section 2702(b)(2)(E) will not allow him to
actually follow it. Instead, Goldberg invokes two much older statutoryinterpretation maxims or canons-ideas that pull in the opposite direction,
away from deference to legislative language-that allow him some wiggle
room: "Congress is presumed to incorporate the common-law meaning of
166. See id. at 35-38.

167. Id. at 16.
168. See generally David W. Robertson, Our High Court of Admiralty and Its Sometimes Peculiar
Relationship With Congress, ST. Louis U. L.J. (forthcoming 2011).

169. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
170. Cf GOLDBERG, supra nOte 2, at 35 ("The question of OPA's proper interpretation-of what
liability scheme Congress actually put into place-is distinct from the question of whether OPA's liability provisions are optimally designed to realize certain goals or principles.").
171. See infra Part VII-G.
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familiar legal terms[,]"172 and "when statutes depart from common law (in73
cluding admiralty law), those departures should be construed narrowly."'
In the two paragraphs just below, we will see that neither of these principles is properly applicable in the present context.
74
As we saw in part V-B above, the OPA terms "result from"1 and
75
"due to"' are not legal terms; they are the language of everyday English.
Both terms are synonyms for "caused by." A similar synonym is "because
of." In Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc., the Supreme Court used an

ordinary dictionary, together with the Court's own view of the term's "ordinary meaning," and reference to "common talk," to reach the conclusion
that the statutory term because of "indicates a but-for causal relationship."176 But-for causation is factual causation; there is no hint of any
"proximate" qualification, and certainly not of any use-right qualification.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that that the venerable statutes-in-derogation maxim must not be applied to "remedial" maritime statutes, which must "be liberally construed" in the interest of the intended
beneficiaries.' 77 A mere glance at OPA's legislative history confirms that
OPA is quintessential remedial maritime legislation, beyond a shadow of a
doubt.178 Indeed, courts routinely refer to OPA as "remedial legislation."' 7 9 Moreover, in its recent jurisprudence the Court has applied the
172. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 20 n.42. Professor Goldberg cites a recent case, United States v.
Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997), for this proposition, but the proposition is very old. See Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (calling the principle "well established" and citing,
inter alia, a case decided in 1915).
173. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 31. Here Professor Goldberg cites Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S.
that "a statute in
557, 565 (1879). See also State v. Courchesne, 998 A.2d 1, 38 (Conn. 2010) (stating
derogation of the common law" must be strictly construed) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).

175. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E).
176. 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
177. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936). To the same effect, see Chandris, Inc. v.
Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 378-79 (1995) (Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Breyer, concurring); Hellenic Lines
Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 310 (1970); Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958);

Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 782 (1952); Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337
U.S. 783, 789-90 (1949); Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 156-57 (1934); Cortes v. Bait. Insular Line,
Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 375 (1932); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1930). Cf Atchison, T. &

S.F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987) (stating that the Federal Employers' Liability Act is a
"broad remedial statute" which must be given a liberal construction).
178. At 42 n.91, Professor Goldberg suggests that the Supreme Court is presently leery of apply. . . to
canon of statutory interpretation that favors a liberal reading of 'remedial' legislation
"the
ing
Under
CERCLA
of
Construction
Liberal
Watson,
A.
Blake
citing
environmental protection statutes,"
the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV.
ENv'T. L. REV. 199 (1996). Professor Goldberg provides no pinpoint citation to the Watson article,
and I have not found in the piece the suggested indicia of Supreme Court leeriness.
179. Unocal Corp. v. United States, 222 F.3d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Metlife Capital Corp.,
132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir. 1997); Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d 820, 826 (N.D. Tex.
Line Co. v.
1999); In re Jahre Spray II KIS, 1996 WL 451315 at *4 (D. N.J. Aug. 5, 1996); Sun Pipe
Conewago Contractors, Inc., 1994 WVL 539326 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1994); Avitts v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 840 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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broad construction principle to maritime legislation generally, without regard to the "remedial" characterization. 80 In urging the application of the
statutes-in-derogation canon to the construction of OPA, Professor
Goldberg seeks to resurrect a bygone (and largely unlamented's') era in
admiralty and maritime jurisprudence.182
The last of Professor Goldberg's statutory-interpretation policies is an
admonition that OPA ought not to be construed in such a way as "to draw
irrational or entirely arbitrary distinctions among classes of possible claimants."s18 This is surely sound advice, but it supports fidelity to the cause-infact requirements that Congress actually wrote into the statute 84 rather
than calling for engrafting a proximate cause/use-right requirement onto
the statute as Goldberg proposes. Part VI above demonstrates that Congress's actual factual-causation requirements enable courts to draw principled lines,185 while Professor Goldberg's proposed use-right requirement
would exclude ships' chandlers, who ought to be regarded as righteous
claimants under any principled reading of OPA's remedial scheme. Indeed, it is noteworthy that at several points, Professor Goldberg tries to
avoid the appearance of arbitrary exclusions by confessing that he would
not always insist on the use-right requirement. 186

180. See Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998) (holding that the Death on the High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308, displaces federal maritime common law); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Hig-

ginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (same); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (holding
that the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, displaces key features of federal maritime law); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that the Death on the High Seas Act preempts state
law).
181. See generally Robertson, supra note 168.
182. Cf GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 25 n.56 (stating that "[t]he substantive rules of federal admi-

ralty law have been developed primarily by federal courts"). This claim is belied by Miles, where the
unanimous Supreme Court proclaimed: "Maritime tort law is now dominated by federal statute." 498
U.S. at 36.
183.

GOLDBERG,

supra note 2, at 36.

184. As is emphasized throughout this Article, Section 2702(a) requires claimants to show that
their damages "result[ed] from" an oil spill or a substantial threat of one, and Section 2702(b)(2)(E)
requires economic loss claimants to show that their damages were "due to injury, destruction, or loss"
of tangible property or natural resources. As we saw supra Part VI, these provisions establish a principled distinction between hypothetical "Universe" claimants 1 through 10 (whose damages probably
would not occurred if there had been only the threat of a spill or somehow a spill that caused no
physical harm to anything) and claimants 11 through 17 (who probably would have had much the same
kinds of losses from even the threat of a significant spill).
185. See supra Part VI.
186. See GOLDBERG, supru note 2, at 33 (suggesting that liability might properly be "extend[ed] to

certain additional claimants" who did not have the "exclusive or near-exclusive [use] rights" that
Goldberg would generally require); id. at 40 & n.92 (indicating that "Universe" claimant # 5-the barge
owner/operator-should probably be compensated although he might not be able to meet the use-right
requirement); id. at 41-42 (seemingly calling for similar leniency for claimants 6 through 8-restaurant,
real estate agent, furniture store near spill).
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Other Policy Considerations

The "Policy Considerations" subsection of the Goldberg paper1 87 has
two main themes. The first is to proclaim the inherent wisdom of "prioritiz[ing]" physical-injury claims over economic loss claims."' This seems a
bit ex cathedra on Goldberg's part; in fact the wisdom of treating physical
property damage more favorably than other kinds of financial setbacks has
been widely debated.189 More importantly, Congress made a different
choice in OPA. Subsection B of Section 2702(b)(2) provides that property
owners and lessors can recover damages for "injury to" or "destruction of"
property, whereas subsection E treats property owners, lessors, and all
other claimants alike in allowing recovery of damages "due to the injury,
destruction, or loss of [property] or natural resources." The structure and
language of the two subsections seem to reflect equal prioritization of phys90
ical property damage and other types of economic loss claims.1
Professor Goldberg's second policy theme is that there are several
good arguments for preferring victims "most immediately and tangibly affected by a spill" over "what might be termed 'second-order'
claim[ants]."' 91 All of this is entirely plausible, and it helps to explain why
Congress included the factual causation limit in Section 2702(b)(2)(E).
187. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 35-38.
188. See id. at 35.
189. See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985)
(criticizing a physical-injury requirement as "capricious[ ]," "arbitrar[y]," "formalis[tic]," and hypertechnical); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979) (stating that "injury to a tenant's business can often result in greater hardship than damage to a tenant's person or property"); Louisiana ex
rel. Guste v. M/ Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1044 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Wisdom, J., joined by four
other judges, dissenting) (stating that "[a]t bottom . . . the requirement of a tangible injury is artificial
because it does not comport with accepted principles of tort law").
190. Suppose an oil spill fouls a tourist hotel's private beach and the ocean near it, causing the
hotel to lose business and lay off a worker. Sections 2702(b)(2)(B) and 2702(b)(2)(E) seem to put the
hotel's owner and laid-off employee on equal footing; both would be entitled to the economic damages
that provably resulted from the spill's fouling the beach and ocean. Professor Goldberg apparently
agrees. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 40 (treating "Universe" claimants 3 and 4 as equally
deserving).
Now imagine a similar scenario in which the precipitating event is not an actual spill with consequent fouling of the beach and ocean but instead the widely reported threat of such a spill. Here again,
it seems that subsections (B) and (E) would put the hotel and its laid-off employee on equal footing.
Because no tangible property has been injured or destroyed, subsection (B) would presumably avail the
owner nothing. Nor would the "injury" and "destruction" categories of subsection (E) afford either
claimant any relief. The owner and employee could argue (perhaps successfully, but see supra note 32)
that the threat caused the "loss" of property and of a natural resource. Neither would have a better
argument than the other.
In connection with the threat scenario, it should be noted that Professor Goldberg is probably
wrong in arguing that subsection (E) may be more restrictive in threat situations than any of the other
subsections of Section 2702(b)(2). See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 19-20 n.40. Subsection (F) applies
only when there has been "a discharge of oil." Subsection (B) requires "injury to" or "destruction of"
property, which might not normally occur in threat situations. Subsections (C), (D), and (E) are alike
in requiring that property or natural resources have been injured, destroyed, or lost, so none of them
would generally apply in threat cases unless "loss" is read to include "loss of use." But see supra note
32 (noting a problem with reading "loss" in Section 2702(b)(2) to include "loss of use").
191. GOLDBERG, Supra nOte 2, at 36-37.
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None of Goldberg's arguments against compensating second-order claimants provides a basis for choosing his proximate cause/use-right limit over
the one Congress wrote into the statute.
G.

Back to the Beginning: The Actual Language of OPA

As has been emphasized throughout this Article, there is no "direct"
causation, "proximate cause," or "use-right" language in Section 2702.
Professor Goldberg puts it there in a brilliant demonstration of "that subtle
technique of misdirecting the attention of his audience, which is the beginning and end of the conjurer's art." 19 2 The Goldberg paper cannot be fully
understood and appreciated without taking a close look at the essence of
Professor Goldberg's art.
1. The Conjurer's Art: Seven Steps and Three Rabbits
We begin with a review of what the statute actually says (with emphasis supplied). Section 2702(a) says that claimants can recover the "damages
specified in subsection (b) of this section that result from such incident."
("Such incident" means "the discharge or threatened discharge of oil." 193 )
Section 2702(b)(2)(E) says that "any claimant" (including those who claim
no proprietary interest in anything affected by the oil spill or threatened oil
spill) can recover economic damages (for lost profits or impairment of
earning capacity) when such damages are "due to the injury, destruction, or
loss of real property, personalproperty, or natural resources." The artful

process by which Professor Goldberg transforms those provisions into a
proximate cause/use-right requirement involves seven steps.
Step One. Goldberg begins by taking every opportunity to state or
imply that it is self-evident that the subsection (a) term "result from" and
the subsection (b)(2)(E) term "due to" are bound to have different

meanings. 194

Step Two. Eventually-when the reader has presumably become suitably conditioned to accepting that the different phrasings simply must convey different meanings-comes the second step, where Professor Goldberg
sets the stage for the demonstration by stating:
With respect to liability for economic loss that does not
arise out of damage to property or resources that the claimant herself owns or leases, the key issue is whether OPA
192. ROBERTSON DAVIES, FIFTH BUSINEss 215 (King Penguin ed. 1983).
193. In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd., 444 F.3d 371, 383 (5th Cir. 2006).
194. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 3 (juxtaposing the "result from" and "due to" phrases so as
to imply they have different meanings); id. at 10 (same); id at 11 (subtitle featuring "The 'Due To'
Requirement"); id. at 15 (subtitle featuring "Actual Causation" [i.e., factual causation] introducing two
paragraphs that treat only the Section 2702(a) "result from" requirement and omit any mention of the
Section 2702(b)(2)(E) "due to" requirement); id. at 16 (subtitle on the "'Due To' Clause" designed to
imply that the clause addresses something other than "actual [i.e., factual] causation); id. at 16 (juxtaposing the "result from" and "due to" phrases so as to imply that the terms have different meanings).

2011]

OPA'S PROVISIONS ON DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS

197

contains an additional requirement beyond: (1) proof of responsibility for a discharge under Section 2702(a); (2) proof
of actual economic loss; and (3) proof of actual [i.e., factual]
causation, or whether these are the only requirements.19 5
Some conjurer's misdirection is involved at this step, because whether subsection (b)(2)(E)'s "due to" clause adds something to subsection (a)'s "result from" clause is not a meaningful issue at all, much less the "key
issue "-obviously the answer is yes. At Step Two, Goldberg is putting
three rabbits into the hat.
Step Three. In fairly short order, Professor Goldberg then flourishes
the first rabbit, proclaiming the obviousness of the fact that Section
2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due to" clause "imposes a second-layer causation requirement on top of the initial 'result from' requirement set by Section 2702(a).
A claimant relying on these sections must prove damage to, or loss of,
property or natural resources that 'result[s] from' a discharge, and lost
profits or impaired earning capacity 'due to' that damage or loss." 196 A
page later, Goldberg emphasizes the solidity of this first rabbit by noting
that a failure to read subsection (b)(2)(E)'s "due to" clause as adding
something to subsection (a)'s "result from" clause would involve treating
the (E) clause as "mere surplusage." 197 This first rabbit, whose name is
Second-Layer Causation, is well credentialed.198
Step Four. Professor Goldberg then proceeds with setting the stage for
the production of the second rabbit. He does this by speculating about the
operation of two imaginary statutes, one without subsection (E)'s "due to"
clausel 99 and another with the phrase "due to" defined to mean "accompanied by" rather than "caused by." 20 0
Step Five. In an elegant segue from the imaginary statutes back to the
real-world OPA, Goldberg then produces the second rabbit, stating:
By contrast [with the imaginary statutes], it is entirely natural to read Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due to" clause as requiring as a condition of recovery for lost profits or
impaired earning capacity a nexus beyond bare causation between the lost profits or impaired earning capacity (on the
one hand) and the damage to or loss of property or natural
resources (on the other). No interpretive gymnastics are re-

quired. Rather, one need only treat the phrase "due to" as
195. Id. at 16.

196.
197.
198.
two-level

Id. at 17 (Goldberg's emphasis).
Id. at 18.

Professor Goldberg is obviously right that the "due to" clause must mean something. And
factual causation inquiries are staples of environmental and tort law. See the discussion of
Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Interior and E. Tex. Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge at supra notes 71 and 78. (The
Rutledge court explained, 453 S.w. 2d at 468-69, that it used the term "proximate cause" to mean
cause-in-fact.)
199. See GoLDBERG, supra note 2, at 17-18.
200. Id.at 18-20.
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refining the actual [i.e., factual] causation requirement already specified by the "result from" language of Section

2702(a). 2 0 1
Professor Goldberg then announces this rabbit's name: it is "a proximate
cause limitation. "202 Whereas the first rabbit, Second-Layer Causation,
was not totally unexpected, this second one, Proximate Cause, is an impressive surprise: Goldberg has now read "common law notions of proximate
cause" 2 03 into subsection (E)'s "due to" clause. In flourishing the rabbit
named Proximate Cause, Professor Goldberg proclaims that reading subsection (E)'s "due to" language to mean "proximately caused by" has the
effect of "setting an additional filter on liability beyond actual [i.e., factual]
cause-one that requires as a condition of recovery for lost profits or impaired earning capacity a more substantial [than factual causation] connection between the happening of those losses and the happening of harm to
property or resources." 204
Step Six. It takes a while for the third rabbit to come out of the hat.
Professor Goldberg must first take his audience on a journey into the operations of and exceptions to the Robins/Testbank rule in federal maritime
and state tort law. This is not misdirection-by now we suspect what's
coming-but it sets the stage by heightening the anticipation.
Step Seven. Then out comes the third rabbit. Waving the venerable
but nowadays largely discredited "statutes in derogation" maxim 205 like a
magic wand, Professor Goldberg proclaims:
[Probably] Congress's aim in enacting Section
2702(b)(2)(E) was to extend liability along the lines tentatively identified by [the] judicial decisions that have [modestly] pushed the boundaries of the economic loss rule. To
say the same thing: OPA's economic loss provisions are best
understood as expanding liability for economic loss beyond
owners and lessees of property that has been damaged to
any person whose business's profitability depends on his or
her ability to exercise a right physically to obtain or use
property or resources that are damaged or lost because of
an oil spill.... Reading OPA in this manner makes sense of
the "due to" clause's linkage of recovery for economic loss
to property or resources being damaged or made physically
unavailable. Economic loss is "due to" property or resource
damage, or loss, when profits or earnings suffer because the
damage, or loss, prevents or hinders the claimant from putting that property or those resources to commercial use, as
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 20 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 20 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
See supra notes 173 and 177-182.
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is her right. Any claimant who has such a use-right-regardless of whether the right amount to an ownership or
lease interest-stands to recover. 206
Voila! Say hello to the Use-Right Rabbit.
2. Magician's Patter2 0 7 (with brief rejoinders)
The Goldberg paper augments its presentation of the three rabbitsSecond-Layer Causation, Proximate Cause, and Use-Right-with a surprisingly effective running commentary that continually asserts Professor
Goldberg's fidelity to the statute. Here are the main bits, followed in indented italics by this Article's brief rejoinders:
[T]he "due to" clause of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) stands separate and apart from 2702(a)'s "result from" clause, and, as
such, explicitly states an independent limitation on [economic loss] liability. 208
Yes, but it does not explicitly state a proximate cause or
use-right limit. On its face it sets an additional factual
causation requirement.

[This paper's] reading of OPA does not purport to find buried within the statute an implicit, unstated limitation on liability for economic loss. Rather, it identifies the "due to"
clause as an expressly stated limitation on such liability. 209
The proximate cause and use-right limits were deeply
buried if there at all. Goldberg the conjurer worked
hard and skillfully to produce them.

[I]t is entirely natural to read Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due
to" clause as requiring . . . a nexus beyond bare causation . . . No interpretive gymnastics are required. 2 1 0

It seems unnatural to read the phrase "due to" to mean
"proximately caused by," and still more unnatural to
find a use-right limitation in that phrase. The performance of Goldberg, the conjurer, was far more impressive than the doings of any ordinary gymnast.
[This paper's] reading of OPA's economic loss provisions is
perfectly consonant with judicial readings of highly compa-

rable statutes. 211
206. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 32.
207. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1315

(unabridged

2d

ed. 1975) defines patter to mean "the glib, rapid speech of salesmen, circus barkers, magicians, etc."
Professor Goldberg's commentary on his presentation of the proximate cause/use-right interpretation
of Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due to" clause is eloquent rather than glib. But the rest of the definition fits.
208. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 17 n.36 (emphasis supplied).
209. Id. at 18 n.38 (Goldberg's emphasis).
210. Id. at 20 (emphasis supplied).
211. Id. at 20 (emphasis supplied).
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For many reasons, the statutes Goldberg has in mindCERCLA and TAPAA-are far from being "highly
comparable" to OPA.21 2 Neither included a two-level
cause-in-fact requirement like OPA's, and neither had
anything like the many features of OPA's legislative history demonstrating that Congress did not want to require
economic loss claimants to show proximate causation or
a use right.

[T]he interpretation of OPA provided here does not rest on
finding in Section 2702(b)(2)(E) an implicit proximate cause
limitation of a sort that might run afoul of the Russello2 13
inference of intentional exclusion. Rather it rests on the
fact that OPA explicitly sets two distinct causation-related
requirements. 1 4
The implication that the "due to" clause "explicitly" sets
a proximate cause or use-right requirement is fabulously
false.

If [CERCLA and TAPAA] are properly read to contain a
proximate cause limitation, the implication that OPA includes a categorical limit on liability for economic loss is irresistible. As we have seen, the only function that can

possibly be ascribed to the "due to" clause is that of setting
an additional filter on liability beyond actual [i.e., factual]
cause-one that requires as a condition of recovery for lost
profits or impaired earning capacity a more substantial connection between the happening of those losses and the happening of harm to property or resources. 215
Professor Goldberg has failed to establish that CERCLA and TAPAA were interpreted to include a proximate cause limit, and certainly they were never read to
include any use-right limitation of the sort that

Goldberg envisages.2 16
[No] . . . irrational or entirely arbitrary distinctions [are cre-

ated by this paper's] interpretation of OPA's economic loss

provisions. 217
The use-right requirement seems to deny compensation
to ships' chandlers, and denying them compensation
seems irrational and arbitrary.218 The Goldberg paper
handled this problem by ignoring it. If the problem is
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra Part VII-A.
See supra note 118.
GOLDBERG, Supra note 2, at 21 n.42 (Goldberg's emphasis).
Id. at 22-23 (emphasis supplied).
See supra Part VII-A.
GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 36.
See supra Part VI.
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handled by relaxing the use- right requirement, this
seems to undercut the entire Goldberg proposal.
H.

Postscript:Professor Goldberg Argues Against His Own Proposal

The Goldberg paper acknowledges that "the various damages provisions of Section 2702(b) are written generically to cover all violations of
Section 2702(a) . . . [E]ach of the . . . six separate damages provisions

purport to apply to any type of discharge that violates Section 2702(a)." 2 1 9
Thus, whether the situation at hand is a threatened spill, a relatively small
spill, or a monster like Macondo-and whether the conduct of the responsible party is merely enough for strict liability, or bad enough to expose the
responsible party to damages above the OPA caps, or still more blameworthy, moving into potential punitive damages territory-the six separate
damages provisions ought to take a coherent approach to determining conceptual limits on compensatory damages. They ought not be read in such a
way as to clash with one another or to create arbitrary or irrational distinctions among themselves.
The best way to achieve such coherence would be to aim for complete
fidelity to the language of the six separate subsections of 2702(b). On that
view, subsection (A) allows governmental trustees to recover damages for
injury, destruction, loss, or loss of use of natural resources caused by a spill
or threatened spill. Subsection (B) allows owners and lessors of property
to recover damages for injury or destruction of their property caused by a
spill or threatened spill. 220 Subsection (C) allows subsistence users of natural resources to recover damages for loss of use of such resources when
brought about by a spill or threatened spill that has caused injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources. 221 Subsection (D) allows political entities
to recover damages for loss of taxes and similar revenues when brought
about by a spill or threatened spill that has caused injury, destruction, or
loss of property or natural resources. Subsection (E) allows any claimant
to recover damages for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
brought about by a spill that has caused injury, destruction, or loss of property or natural resources. Subsection (F) allows governmental entities to
recover damages for the costs of providing additional public services
caused by a spill; it does not apply to threatened spills.
No arbitrary or irrational distinctions are apparent in the preceding
paragraph, which does what Professor Goldberg calls for: It applies the
"liability scheme Congress actually put into place." 222 In sharp contrast,
the Goldberg use-right proposal would either create confusion approaching
219. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 19-20 & n.40.
220. A threatened spill might cause injury or destruction of property through the actions of threat
responders.
221. A threatened spill might cause injury or destruction of natural resources through the actions
of threat responders. Additionally, it may be appropriate to hold that natural resources have been
"lost" when a threat-induced embargo prevents their availability. See supra note 32.
222. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 35.
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chaos, or it would place subsections (D) and (E) at odds with one another.
These two subsections use identical language in describing their secondlayer causation requirements: "due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real
property, personal property, or natural resources." If the quoted clause
entails a use-right limit on damages under (E), should it not also have the
same effect on damages under (D)? But would it make any kind of sense
to bring a use-right inquiry into the taxes-and-revenues context? If not,
then what would be the effect of the "due to" clause in (D) cases? To bring
traditional common-law proximate cause 223 into play? To require the invention of yet another new variant of proximate cause?

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The commercial-use-right proposal of the Goldberg paper is at war
with OPA's language and legislative history. One of the handful of judicial
decisions addressing the relevant OPA provisions has rejected an argument
fairly closely resembling the Goldberg proposal. Moreover, the proposal
seems somewhat vulnerable to criticism on policy and coherence grounds.
The impressive plausibility of the Goldberg paper stems entirely from the
author's remarkable analytical and rhetorical skills. If at the end of the day
it emerges that a legal craftsman of Professor Goldberg's high degree of
proficiency cannot sell a conceptual product, it is probably safe to assume
that the product itself is seriously flawed.

223. See supra note 92.

